




What's Wrong with Stereotyping?
Anita Bernstein
Brooklyn Law School, anita.bernstein@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Legislation Commons, Other Law Commons, and the Social
Welfare Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
55 Ariz. L. Rev. 655 (2013)
WHAT'S WRONG WITH STEREOTYPING?
Anita Bernstein*
With neither statutory proscriptions to uphold nor a clear statement of what they
were trying to do, federal judges in the United States have deemed stereotyping
actionable at law. The judges who built this cause of action moved fast, as
"stereotype" in its modern sense is relatively new. What explains stereotyping as a
legal wrong? Exploring the concept of a stereotype as presented by its coiner, the
public intellectual Walter Lippmann, this Article argues that what's wrong with
stereotyping is unjustifiable constraint.
An answer to the question of what's wrong delivers other answers as well. This
Article shows how current American law and legal institutions exacerbate the
problem of stereotyping as well as lessen it. It says which stereotypes fall outside
the ken of legal remediation. It distinguishes stereotyping from discrimination. It
locates the constitutional law of stereotyping. In its last Part, using examples, it
tells how law and legal institutions repair this wrong.
* Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Faculty
workshops at Arizona, Arizona State, Brooklyn, Florida State, Southern Methodist, and
Washington University law schools improved drafts of this Article; Susan Appleton, Marion
Crain, Greg Crespi, Peggie Smith, and Lawrence Solan gave especially helpful comments.
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Reductive generalizations about groups of persons flourish so robustly in
the contemporary United States that they can spring weedlike into case law even
when no party brought them up. Consider American Freedom Defense Initiative v.
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, a decision applying the First Amendment
to a policy about the content of advertisements on city buses. The ads at issue
asserted, under a caption of "*Support Israel4/Defeat Jihad," that "the savage"
threatens "the civilized man."2 In his opinion, Judge Paul Engelmayer chose to
roam far afield. He remarked that "Upper West Siders are elitist snobs," using
quotation marks to show he didn't mean what he said. His opinion went on to
muse, also inside quotation marks, that fat people might be slobs, blondes bimbos,
lawyers sleazebags, and clerks at a New York supermarket chain "rude and lazy."3
The court did not stop there,4 and we too can play. Librarians shush.
Jocks are dumb. Engineers lack social skills. Politicians are corrupt, car salesmen
dishonest, professors absentminded, ballerinas bulimic, publicists and actors and
lobbyists insincere, drill sergeants domineering. Firefighters are handsome, dim-
witted hunks. Whenever regional divergences in the United States challenge
mellow Californians, hurried New Yorkers, flinty New Englanders, and bland
Midwesterners to get along, they can unite laughing about another cohort. Blood-
relative spouses in Appalachia, perhaps.
American stereotypes-they thrive alongside prohibitions of
discrimination in civil rights statutes,' increased ethnic diversity in the population,6
and the phenomenon known for decades as political correctness 7 -might be
gathered indefinitely, but I will pause. Stereotypes are a social fact. They pervade
life in the United States. If anything is wrong with stereotyping, then the breadth of
the wrong must be wide.
A metaphoric rather than a literal definition of the word starts the inquiry.
"Stereotype" melds a Greek adjective meaning solid, orepe6 (in the Roman
alphabet "stereos"), with a noun for type in the sense of an impression or mold,
in52og ("typos"). In combination, the word means a hard, plate-like cast, something
1. 880 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
2. See http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9JdgVU6XE34/UFn96YfXZEI/AAAAAAAA
KoE/hASiZECRc6Y/sl600/DefeatJihadjpg for an image (last visited Feb. 12, 2013).
3. Am. Freedom Def Initiative, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
4. Id. (generalizing in quotation marks about Democrats, Republicans, "Tea
Party adherents," and other groups).
5. See infra Part III.
6. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Population, in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 10 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/
2012edition.html (reporting shifts counted in the 2010 census).
7. See Richard Bernstein, The Rising Hegemony of the Politically Correct, N.Y.
TINMs, Oct. 28, 1990, at El; Cathy Young, Political Correctness on Campus Goes Too Far
Chills Debate, NEWSDAY, Nov. 26, 2012, at A32.
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that can leave a mark.' Before this term migrated to social psychology and public
discourse in the twentieth century, it had its first English-language home in
printing.9
The American journalist and public intellectual Walter Lippmann gave
this word its contemporary meaning in 1922. Lippmann used the rigidity of
printing technology as a metaphor for how we human beings bring "the world
outside" into "the pictures in our heads." 0 Stereotypes, he observed, are the
"subtlest and most pervasive of all influences."
These influences vary in their effects. Current definitions of the word
stereotype build on Lippmann's modern construct and admit multiple possibilities.
First, a stereotype can "have a positive or negative valence, or indeed neither,
depending on whether the attribute is derogatory or complimentary or indifferent,
good or bad or neutral." 12 Slobs, bimbos, sleazebags, and other pejoratives thus do
not exhaust the category:13 A stereotype will occasionally praise a group of
persons. The Oxford English Dictionary definition of stereotype-"a
preconceived and oversimplified idea of the characteristics which typify a
person'"-allows for neutral and positive constructs, as does the even broader
definition proffered by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, who writes that
"stereotypes are [only] widely held associations between a given social group and
8. See REBECCA J. COOK & SIMONE CUSACK, GENDER STEREOTYPING:
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 9 (2010); see also DAVID J. SCHNEIDER, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF STEREOTYPING 8 (2004).
9. "Stereotyping" in Supreme Court decisional law once referred only to
printing technology. See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 623 (1888) (marking the
Court's first use of the word); see also Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219,
229 (1917) ("printing, electrotyping, photoengraving and stereotyping").
10. WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 3 (1922).
11. Id. at 89-90.
12. MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF
KNOWING 31 (2007).
13. See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d
456, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
14. Stereotypes in the United States, for example, ascribe intelligence to some
Asian Americans and Jews, athletic prowess to subgroups of African-American men and
boys, and a flair for aesthetics to "the queer eye." See Charles Stangor, The Study of
Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination Within Social Psychology: A Quick History of
Theory and Research, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 1,
4 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009). "Every positive element" of the model minority stereotype,
writes one scholar, "is matched to a negative counterpart. To be intelligent is to lack
personality. To be hard-working is to be unfairly competitive. To be family-oriented is to be
clannish, 'too ethnic,' and unwilling to assimilate. To be law-abiding is to be rigidly rule-
bound, tied to traditions in the homeland . . . ." Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White:
Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLDL.J. 225, 240-41 (1995).
15. 16 OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 651 (2d ed. 1989). My conjugation of the
verb "to stereotype" is unknown to the OED. See id. at 652 (including only three definitions
of "stereotyping": "[t]he action or process of making stereotype plates for printing," "[t]he
action of fixing or perpetuating in an unchanging form," or, in zoology, "[t]he frequent
repetition by an animal of an action that has no purpose").
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one or more attributes."1 6 Second, these definitions of stereotypes are agnostic on
the question of whether the associations asserted or implied are true or false or
somewhere in between.
Anyone who asks what's wrong with stereotyping," accordingly, has to
stipulate that not all stereotypes are wrong in the sense of doing harm that is severe
enough to warrant sanction from the law, a costly response. Some stereotypes
might be false or unreliable but do not offend the groups of people they
reference. 8 Some might offend but have the virtue of being reliable, or true
enough.
Exclusions noted, many-probably most-messages in stereotypes are
reductive and demeaning.1 9 The negative consequences they install can cause
social losses. 20 Thus they injure: and so stereotyping, like every other source of
detriment attributable to the actions of human beings, warrants attention from the
law. The law leaves countless detriments unremedied, undeterred, and
unaddressed, to be sure; but harm is the law's raison d'tre.2 1 Stereotyping invites
work from institutions empowered to effect legal change.
What is wrong, as far as the law should care, with stereotyping? 22 The
answer explored in this Article is that stereotyping is wrong to the extent that it
functions to deprive individuals of their freedom without good cause. Wrongful
stereotyping constrains some groups of people more and others less. Like
environmental pollution, redlining by mortgage lenders, disregard for occupational
safety, misbranding of consumer products, nondisclosure of information pertinent
to the sale of securities, and other ills, it is a behavior that has adverse
consequences for the public. It therefore lies within reach of new regulation-
broadly understood: I will not in this Article propose the codification of particular
legal rules, nor suggest paths to redress in court for the wrongs of stereotyping.
16. FRICKER, supra note 12, at 30.
17. Because this Article addresses an action that may be amenable to regulation
by the law, rather than "a stereotype" or "stereotypes" simpliciter, the gerund form suits its
content.
18. An example of a benign stereotype that might be false or unreliable: " [U]pon
hearing that someone went to a certain excellent law school and served as a local bar
association president, a prospective employer might conjure up a stereotype of how
intelligent or professional the person is before meeting him or her." Kerri Lynn Stone,
Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 591, 624 (2011). The stereotype here seems
vague, but it may exist.
19. See OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 15.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See Avani Mehra Sood & John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm in the
Service of Criminalization Goals, 100 CAL. L. REv. 1313, 1317 (2012) (noting this precept
in the work of John Stuart Mill); see also John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitcoff, Torts
and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REv. 335, 366
(2013) (expounding on the common law maxim that where there is a right, there is a
remedy).
22. Cf Lawrence Blum, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: A Moral Analysis, 33
PHIL. PAPERS 251 (2004) (offering an answer grounded in philosophy).
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Instead, I argue that the law now buttresses this source of unjustified constraint and
ought to stop doing so.23
Constraint emerges from what Walter Lippmann, creator of the modem
meaning of this word, identified as "the perfect stereotype":24 In his classic study
of political community, Aristotle wrote that some people are slaves by nature.2
Not all enslaved persons, Aristotle said, fit that description:2 6 But slaves by nature
must not, indeed cannot, become free citizens. If "by nature a slave"27 is indeed the
perfect stereotype-a contention I embrace and elaborate on in this Article-then
this status category helps explain what is wrong with stereotyping today, a century
and a half after Abraham Lincoln issued his famed Emancipation Proclamation.28
Stereotypes now doing mischief, I argue in Part I, keep alive the
Aristotelian slaves-by-nature construct by characterizing particular groups of
persons as unruly and in need of authoritative constraint. The constraint message
that stereotyping relays and reifies brings particular harm to women of all races
and African-American men. Cast respectively as crazy2 (consider "psycho bitch,"
a locution that has won ten elaborate definitions on the crowdsourced Urban
Dictionary3) and violent ("the angry black man"31), these two groups bear an
extraordinarily severe brunt of contemporary American stereotyping.
An early task for rectifiers interested in easing this brunt is to form a
clearer understanding of stereotyping. Psychologists spent decades building an
enormous descriptive literature on point.32 Several of these pioneers, testifying as
expert witnesses, have explained patterns and consequences to judges. 33 Though
23. Cf Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-
Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L.
REv. 73, 78 (1994) ("1 make the modest claim that" . . . a particular practice "should stop").
See also infra note 337 and accompanying text (describing Professor Chamallas's proposal).
24. LIPPMANN, supra note 10, at 98.
25. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, at 6-7 (Benjamin Jowett trans. 2009). Lippmann,
having started Public Opinion with a passage that mused on the shadows of Plato's cave,
remained in ancient Greece to find this emblematic stereotype. LIPPMANN, supra note 10, at
passage preceding Table of Contents.
26. ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, at 7-9.
27. Id. at 6.
28. See Eric Foner, Op-Ed., The Emancipation of Abe Lincoln, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
1, 2013, at A19 (noting, on the sesquicentennial anniversary of the proclamation, that
"Lincoln did not live to provide an answer" to problems of justice left unresolved by his
decree).
29. A problematic word, but the best available for this purpose.
30. Psycho Bitch, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.con
define.php?term=psycho%20bitch (last visited Jul. 16, 2013).
31. See Ta-Nehisi Coates, Fear of a Black President, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2012, at
76; Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1169 (2008).
32. Blum, supra note 22, at 251-52. The other discipline that has investigated
stereotyping, cultural and media studies, has had less influence on the law. See id.
33. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011)
(reporting the testimony of sociologist William Bielby); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 235-36 (1989) (reporting the testimony of psychologist Susan Fiske); Tuli v.
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influential to the outcomes of key cases, their insights have not aligned to create a
juridical account of stereotyping that can guide conduct ex ante. Nor do they
predict whether courts will condemn any particular instance of the phenomenon.
And only a small share of this research has focused on what is central to law:
harm. 34
Part II notes three conditions present in the subset of stereotypes that the
law ought to recognize as wrongful. Each of these conditions distinguishes
stereotyping from something else. The first distinction that Part II proposes is
between what is and is not harmful to individuals. Stereotyping has to hurt people
in order to warrant intervention from the law. The second distinction builds on
work by Frederick Schauer to distinguish generalizing (which the law cannot avoid
and which delivers important benefits) from stereotyping, which unlike
generalizing can be categorically wrongful. The third condition divides wrongful
stereotyping from invidious discrimination. Unlike the other two distinctions, this
one does not purport to sort malign from benign. Wrongful stereotyping and
invidious discrimination are both bad, almost tautologically so. To avoid
redundancy and be useful as a legal category, however, stereotyping must contain
content distinct from discrimination or prejudice. Part II portrays its contribution in
a Venn diagram.
Having described the phenomenon, this Article moves to consider
rectification as a job for the law. Judges, legislators, litigators, and laypersons in
the United States live in a social world that stereotyping has helped to inform,
explain, and create. Steeped in "the subtlest and most pervasive of all
influences," 35 American law has, perhaps understandably enough, recognized as
actionable injury only a small fraction of what is wrong. Courts and legislatures
identify stereotyping as a manifestation of employment discrimination and almost
nothing else. Part III focuses on the most influential judicial condemnation of the
phenomenon, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.36
The plurality in Price Waterhouse, a late work in the career of an
influential liberal, continues to vex and fascinate judges and commentators. I read
it as grounded in the intuition and vote counting behind "getting to five," 37 and
speculate that Justice Brennan understood that opposition to stereotyping would be
Brigham & Women's Hosp., 592 F. Supp. 2d 208, 214 (D. Mass. 2009) (reporting the
testimony of psychologist Peter Glick); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1257,
1264-65 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (reporting the testimony of Fiske and Bielby); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-03 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (reporting the
testimony of Fiske).
34. One approach to stereotyping does focus on harm. Matt L. Huffman,
Introduction: Gender, Race, and Management, 639 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 6,
9 (2012) (noting that the stereotype "content model" focuses on "sexism, heterosexism,
racism, anti-immigrant biases, ageism, and classism").
35. LIPPMANN, supra note 10, at 89.
36. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
37. Dahlia Lithwick, Getting to Five, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 2010, at BR 20
(reviewing SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION
(2010)).
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attractive to prospective allies. He chose a characterization of what Price
Waterhouse did to Ann Hopkins that both succeeded and failed: Brennan drew
three co-signers and two concurrences, a solid majority, but sowed confusion
about what exactly Title VII forbids. Part III examines this precedent along with a
precursor and more recent case law. I note the questions it left open and broach
provisional answers.
Courts that equate stereotyping with employment discrimination perform
commendable reparative work that has a long way to go. The precedents that
deemed stereotyping actionable rested on expert evidence that found the
phenomenon endemic in the United States, not just in the workplace.38 Part IV
canvasses domains other than employment where particular groups of persons
suffer law-related detriments that depend on, and reinforce, pernicious and
perdurable stereotypes. The examples of Part IV do not amount to a full catalogue.
They suffice, however, to present American law and legal institutions not only as
proscribers and adjudicators in the Price Waterhouse mode, but also complicit in
what's wrong.
Legal institutions that undertake repair have both a constitutional base to
work from and a set of sector-specific tasks to achieve. Part V explores the
constitutional base. If stereotyping relates to enslavement, as Part I argued, then
any focus on ameliorating its harms necessarily points to a foundational text on
emancipation, the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. This Article joins
literature that reads the Thirteenth Amendment as not just an artifact of settled
history but central to current problems of law and politics. Part V heeds good
counsel offered in this corpus-Jamal Greene's argument that the contemporary
function of the Thirteenth Amendment is to inform and inspire political change
rather than resolve disputes in court-by postponing its recommendations of what
legal institutions ought to do.39 Fixing what's wrong with stereotyping falls within
a larger constitutional project that demands more new engagement than new
doctrine.
The next amendment to the Constitution prohibits discriminatory state
action. Courts and legislatures have manifested more comfort with the Fourteenth
Amendment than the Thirteenth, whose contemporary applications remain elusive,
and would likely find in it a stronger mandate for them to act.40 Consistent with the
tack taken earlier in this Part and throughout the Article, my discussion of the
38. See Brief of Amici Curiae, National Employment Lawyers Association et al.
in Support of Respondents at 12, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011)
(No. 10-277) (gender); see also Expert Report of Willliam T. Bielby, Ph.D. at 40-46,
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (N. D. Ill. 2008)
(No. 05CV06583), 2008 WL 6587777 (race).
39. Jamal Greene, Thirteenth Amendment Optimism, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1733
(2012).
40. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1459, 1464 (2012) (accounting for the relative strength of




Fourteenth Amendment does not purport to write new rules or urge particular
results for disputes that come to court. Rather, I argue that legal institutions that
buttress the wrongs of stereotyping contribute to harm at what might be called the
border of state action. The Fourteenth Amendment provides a reason for them to
stop doing so.
With a constitutional foundation for the project laid, opportunities
emerge. Part VI gives examples of how American law has already installed
changes that help to ameliorate some harms of wrongful stereotyping. The end of
this Part identifies discrete functions for three sectors, with attention to the ways
these institutional actors perceive and can help rectify the problem. The sectors are
lawyers and their clients, judges, and legislators. An enhanced understanding of
stereotyping-one that distinguishes between harmful and nonharmful variations
of the problem, provides law-based deterrence and recourse for the harmful kind,
and leaves alone those instances of stereotyping that do not constrain anyone-will
increase freedom.
I. "THE PERFECT STEREOTYPE"-"BY NATURE A SLAVE"
A. Two Political Theorists Weigh In
A handful of Athenians had started to doubt their practice of slavery by
the fourth century B.C." They did not propose abolition of the status, but
wondered about its justice.4 2 What made slavery look dubious in ancient Athens
was not the mistreatment of enslaved individuals, but benevolence. Male slaves
shared some privileges of free men, and they appeared freer the higher they stood
on the disenfranchisement ladder.43 Allowances from a master cohort blurred the
line between these persons and full citizens.
In response, the institution won its greatest defender when Aristotle in
Politics declared that a person can be "a slave by nature."" One can tell who these
people are, Aristotle continued.4 6 Some individuals and not others perform servile
work, know how to do it, have the muscles for it.4
That nature (rather than politics or society) has decreed some persons to
be slaves makes for "the perfect stereotype," wrote Walter Lippmann in his classic
Public Opinion.: The defining "hallmark" of a stereotype is that it "precedes the
use of reason; is a form of perception, imposes a certain character on the data of
our senses before the data reach the intelligence."" Human beings, as Lippmann
41. LIPPMANN, supra note 10, at 96.
42. See YVES GARLAN, SLAVERY IN ANCIENT GREECE 119 (Janet Lloyd trans.,
Cornell Univ. Press, expanded and rev. ed. 1988).
43. Id. at 64-65.
44. LIPPMtANN, supra note 10.
45. ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, at 6.
46. See id. at 8.
47. See id.
48. LIPPMANN, supra note 10, at 19.
49. Id. at 21.
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was the first scholar to explain, use stereotypes to understand their world.
Stereotyping fits unfamiliar experiences into grooves that confirm and reassure.
Sweeping, reductive, negative, culturally contingent, and unlinked to
logic or factual support, Aristotle's "by nature formed a slave" generalization
exemplifies the phenomenon of a stereotype, but calling it perfect-that is,
extraordinary among stereotypes-calls for more explanation. Many stereotypes
frame new encounters and experiences by preceding reason, providing a form of
perception, and imposing character on the data of human senses. What is "perfect"
about the slave-by-nature construct? Lippmann did not say. The rest of this Part
sets out to support his contention.
B. The Benign Category Contrasted
Many stereotypes impose little constraint. "The French," for example, as
Marilyn Monroe sang in Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, have been cast as "glad to die
for love. They delight in fighting duels." 0 Across the French frontiers a traveler
might find humorless Genans, bad soldiers in Italy, Spaniards who loll at siesta,
or Mondgasques with more money than regard for the rule of law. Crossing the
borders of France also leads to clich6-commodities like beer and fries in one
country, cuckoo clocks, pocket army knives, and shady bank accounts in another.
Stereotypes like these evoke a wanderer free to disengage, roam in and
out, or reevaluate the national-origin generalization that has framed a newcomer.
Funny or not, they do come across as jocular. They invite give-and-take parity, a
lateral playing field. While countries vary in size and power, every national is a
foreigner somewhere, and most people have an equally long list of countries that
are not theirs. Point the finger of national-origin stereotyping if you like, but
another can point back with equal force at you, or you (along with your target) can
walk away.
Thus American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, noted above," may have interpreted the First
Amendment correctly, but as an aggregator of stereotypes it missed a crucial
distinction. The court invalidated the defendant's policy of rejecting
advertisements that "demean an individual or group on account of 'race, color,
religion, national origin, ancestry, gender, age, disability or sexual orientation."'
Hypothetical ads that called blondes bimbos, lawyers sleazebags, fat people slobs
and so on were, to Judge Engelmayer, fatal to the defendant's position: The MTA
would allow them, the court noted, and so the state of New York "discriminates
based on [the] content" of opinions expressed in advertisements.53 As a rationale
for free speech, fair enough. But if one is willing to overlook for a moment the
problem of state censorship, what the court called "MTA's no-demeaning
50. GENTLEMEN PREFER BLONDES (20th Century Fox 1953).
51. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
52. See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d
456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
53. Id. at 476.
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standard" 4 had a valiant goal. By making reference to classifications protected in
statutory law, it avoided arbitrariness, and through its verb "demean" it adverted to
a history of constraint that has long burdened members of particular groups.
Constraint as a metric suggests that some of the stereotypes assembled for
argument's sake in American Freedom Defense Initiative are less benign than
others. Calling lawyers sleazebags, blonde women bimbos, and fat people slobs is
relatively worrisome because these assertions approach the boundaries of protected
classifications: Writers have argued they demean on the bases of gender, disability,
age, and religion." If these contentions are correct, then the three stereotypes
support hierarchies that a state legislature tried democratically to undermine via
civil rights statutes. By contrast, "Democrats," "Republicans," "Tea Party
adherents," "Upper West Siders," and "store clerks at Gristedes" 5 6 can return slurs
lobbed at them in hypothetical advertisements relatively easily or ignore them with
about the same ease in a belief that they are trivial. Stereotypes about these persons
correspond approximately to the one about the amorous Frenchman: not much
truth-value, not much constraint.
C. Constraint- Worthy Traits That Stereotyping Ascribes to Subgroups
At the other end of the stereotyping spectrum are the stereotypes that
pursue subordination through constraint. They keep in force the Aristotelian
slaves-by-nature construct by characterizing particular subgroups of persons as
unruly. Authoritative control is indispensable; it ensures order and safety.
Different characteristics make people unruly, and so unruliness takes
different manifestations in stereotyping. Here are five illustrative traits.
Stupid. In this stereotype, members of groups are cast as inherently
devoid of the intellectual strength needed to guide their behavior. Variations on the
theme include claims that the cohort is naive, superstitious, childlike, hard to
educate, timorous, devoid of creativity or artistic inspiration, incapable of
understanding science or quantitative material, or ill-suited to master new
technology. The stereotype burdens disadvantaged groups in particular, but will
54. Id. at 459.
55. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JoKES AND LEGAL
CULTURE passim (2005) (observing that many contemporary lawyer jokes recycle old
Jewish jokes); Bruce Blaine & Jennifer McElroy, Selling Stereotypes: Weight Loss
Infomercials, Sexism, and Weightism, 46 SEx ROLES 351, 355 (2002); Lauren E. Jones,
Note, The Framing of Fat: Narratives of Health and Disability in Fat Discrimination
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1996 (2013); Alleen Pace Nilsen, Old Blondes Just Dye
Away: Relationships Between Sexism and Ageism, 55 LANGUAGE ARTS 175 (1978).
56. Am. Freedom Def Initiative, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
57. By "illustrative" I mean supported in decisional law and scholarship.
Litigants, courts, and academic writers have reported law-buttressed constraints that
manifest acceptance of these five ascribed characteristics. See infra Part IV. The list does
not purport to be complete. My thanks to Kathleen Clark for her thoughts on this point and
to Susan Appleton for a pertinent suggestion that space constraints have forced me to omit:
The adjective "domestic," Professor Appleton noted, references a host of stereotypes
manifest in the law.
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occasionally slur privileged persons, such as absentminded professors and college
students in particular fields of study.
Crazy. This one resembles stupid in that it generalizes about the mind of
the stereotyped person, but differs in what it ascribes. The crazy stereotype lands
with particular force on women." Hormone-addled, delusional, weepy, emotional
rather than rational, and perverse are among its variations.
Violent. The angry black man exemplifies this stereotype. His anger is
perceived as indefensible and dangerous rather than righteous.59 Like the
stereotype of crazy, the violent stereotype predicts that the group member will
engage in destructive behavior. He is too committed to expressing anger through
physical assault to be reached by reason or incentives.60
Predatory, Seductive, Manipulative. This stereotype assigns blame or
responsibility for a voluntary act to a member of the stereotyped group even
though this person did not commit it. Reminiscent of exegeses on a Bible story that
held Eve responsible for the action of her adult partner Adam even though Adam
outranked her,61 it finds sly power below a surface of apparent weakness or
softness. Beware the group, goes the message, because its maneuvers are more
malevolent than they look. Its stories will be plausible on the surface, perhaps even
beguiling, but they are wrong. Women and gay men bear the brunt of this
stereotype.
Brutish. This stereotype reduces a group of persons to a subhuman animal
cohort, often (but not always) hulking and strong. Like the crazy stereotype, the
brutish one overlaps with cognitive deficiency while emphasizing a different
threat. Stereotypes about cognitive deficiency, which assert that subgroups are not
smart enough for privileges and power, hold particular sway in government,
private-sector employment, and elite higher education. By contrast, groups
stereotyped as brutish are not perceived as competitors for white-collar or high-
58. See Amy D. Ronner, The Cassandra Curse: The Stereotype of the Female
Liar Resurfaces in Jones v. Clinton, 31 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 123, 134 (1997) (identifying
"five forms of the female liar," most of which ascribe mental instability); supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
59. DONALD BOGLE, TOMS, COONS, MULATTOES, MAMIES, AND BUCKS: AN
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF BLACKS IN AMERICAN FLMs 10-14 (4th ed. 2001) (identifying
"the brutal black buck" hell-bent on rape and other violence as central to The Birth of a
Nation, a landmark of Hollywood racism); DENNIS ROME, BLACK DEMONS: THE MEDIA'S
DEPICTION OF THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MALE CRIMINAL STEREOTYPE 21-22 (2004); Mark
Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, The Racial Components of "Race-Neutral" Crime Policy Attitudes,
23 POL. PSYCHOL. 59 (2002); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulali, Conversations at
Work, 79 OR. L. REv. 103, 111 n.19 (2000) (arguing that bargaining by African-American
male customers comes across in car dealerships as angry).
60. Erin Aubry Kaplan, It's a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad World, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2008, at Al7 ("Black anger is never seen as intellectual in nature, merely primal...").
61. Sally Frank, Eve Was Right to Eat the "Apple": The Importance of Narrative
in the Art of Lawyering, 8 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 79, 79-81 (1996) (offering both this
familiar exegesis and a revisionist alternative).
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wage privilege. The anxiety they provoke is less articulate. They appear dangerous
as bodies housing minds and temperaments that are blank, thick, and opaque.
Emphasizing constraint puts to one side a stereotype that has received
particular attention from social psychologists: "lacking warmth."62 This one has
burdened Germans, Jews, Asian Americans, and "nontraditional women."63
Conceding that the stereotyped group is competent,64 the constraint here takes the
form of diminutions in opportunity, or a policy of returning perceived coldness
with coldness. That a group lacks warmth becomes more of a reason to shun it than
to curb its behaviors. College admission practices that appeared to disfavor Jewish
applicants in the past and appear to disfavor Asian-American applicants at present
suggest that this stereotype may work to exclude competitors who score high on
meritocratic criteria.65 Exclusion also constrains, but it imposes less constraint than
what stereotypes about unruliness render.
Here an interlocutor might ask: What if one of these generalizations
happens to be correct about a particular group, or correct enough? I take up that
possibility below.66 For now I note only the implicit call to constraint. Persons so
stereotyped are not only inferior but also potentially dangerous. The traits ascribed
to them support hampering their freedom.
D. Constraint Manifested
Constraints emerge from stereotypes both externally and internally. The
external kind of constraint falls on the stereotyped group when other people
perceive the group member as in need of authoritative control. As Walter
Lippmann wrote, stereotyping "imposes a certain character on the data of our
senses before the data reach the intelligence," 67 and this conclusion perceives
freedom for the group member as unruliness. Ascribing stupidity, craziness,
violence, predation, or brutishness to other people becomes a reason to limit their
freedom. 68
The stereotype of lacking warmth, a less direct source of constraint for
group members, fosters distrust and suspicion: What do they want? They have an
agenda and they're cold and smart enough to achieve it ruthlessly. Among the
available responses, direct confrontation might favor the person who lacks warmth,
62. See Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content:
Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 878, 879 (2002) (reviewing the literature).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 880.
65. Carolyn Chen, Asians: Too Smart for Their Own Good?, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Dec. 21, 2012, at 8.
66. See infra Part I.B.
67. LIPPMANN, supra note 10, at 21.
68. Anke Passenier, "Women on the Loose": Stereotypes of Women in the Story
of the Medieval Beguines, in FEMALE STEREOTYPES IN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS 61, 64 (Rita
Kloppenborg & Wouter J. Hanegraaff eds., 1995) (arguing that a "woman on the loose"
stereotype posits "that women should be controlled and enclosed, lest disaster will ensue").
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and so shunning appears prudent. Shunning takes the form of rejection in social,
educational, and vocational settings.
Other stereotypes generate consequences that impose constraint more
overtly. Notions that groups are stupid, crazy, or predatory make it harder for
members to obtain positions that require trust. A person so stereotyped at work can
expect to receive fewer chances to exercise judgment, plan strategies, join
powerful teams or subgroups, or deal with valued customers and clients.
Stereotyping also jeopardizes job security when it makes the work performance of
group members look worse than it is.
Outside the workplace, constraint grows cruder. Stereotypes that explain
disruptive or puzzling behaviors by nonstereotyped persons by blaming the
predations or delusions of someone in a stereotyped group restore order on the
surface at the price of suppressing freedom for an individual who does not deserve
that penalty. Violence presumed to lurk in a population motivates more aggressive
law enforcement against it. Privileges to harm another person when one has good
reason-which are found not only in defenses to crimes but also rules of procedure
and professional responsibility that may or may not penalize accusers and their
counsel when they fail to persuade or prevail 6 9-can, with the help of stereotyping,
be interpreted less generously when the initiator comes from a group classed as
unruly.
Constraint also emerges when a group member applies the stereotype to
herself or himself.70 Consider fair-haired women. "I'm hyper-sensitive to being a
young blond woman in financial services," one Melbourne-based financial planner
told a reporter, "so I deliberately set out to gain all the qualifications I could in
order to be taken seriously." A Harvard undergraduate began "Having a Blonde
Moment," an article she published in the Crimson, with the unlikely sentence "I
am not dumb."72
The phenomenon relayed in these anecdotes has been researched under
the rubric of social identity threat, also known as stereotype threat.73 This
69. See infra Part IV (discussing criminal law defenses and complaints brought
in court by women). Courts in the United States differ from their counterparts in other
countries by refusing, in typical cases, to shift fees and costs in favor of prevailing parties.
Procedural sanctions for frivolous or bad faith pleadings are imposed relatively rarely, and
tort actions for abuse of process or malicious prosecution are hard to win.
70. Geoffrey L. Cohen & Julio Garcia, "I am Us": Negative Stereotypes as
Collective Threats, 89 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 566, 567 (2005) (reporting on studies
of African-American and Latino students).
71. Leng Yeow, Perfect Niche: In Practice, FIN. REV. ASSET, Dec. 7, 2012, at
10.
72. Kristi L. Jobson, Having a Blonde Moment, HARVARD CRIMSON (Dec. 2,
2004), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2004/12/2/having-a-blonde-moment-i-am/.
73. The pioneer was Claude Steele, whose experiments found that African-
American students performed better on the Graduate Record Exam when they were not told
that the test measured intellectual strength. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype
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condition of psychological discomfort delivers "an extra mental burden not
experienced by people with a different social identity."" One study supported this
proposition by supplying Asian-American women with selected reminders before
they took a math test." Mentioning the subjects' ethnicity resulted in stronger
performances than what the control group achieved; subjects who were reminded
of their gender performed worse.76 Other studies locate social identity threat
effects on exam performance among Latinos and poor whites, among other
groups." Real-world consequences of internalized stereotypes may include public
health. Yale University researchers, for example, found an association between the
stereotypes that elderly persons held about old age and how well or poorly they
recovered from disabling conditions. Not all searches for social identity threat
find it," but the finding has been replicated in dozens of studies.so
The U.S. presidential election of 2008 presented the first African-
American candidate who had a good chance of winning first the nomination and
then the election. He kept calm when provoked. One contemporary magazine story
observed that white pundits "imploring Obama to get angry, to shed his above-the-
fray cool and fight back" had proposed a risky strategy." In one television debate,
Barack Obama, squeezing into expectations that deliver freedom to unstereotyped
persons while constraining the stereotyped, appeared resolved to give "no hint of
being an 'angry black man'-like those who supposedly torch their own ghettos,
then rape and pillage the white burbs."8 2 His opponent, John McCain, apparently
Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCH. 797, 799 (1995).
74. Joshua Aronson & Matthew S. McGlone, Stereotype and Social Identity
Threat, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 153, 154 (Todd
D. Nelson ed., 2009).
75. Paula Lustbader, Painting Beyond the Numbers: The Art of Providing
Inclusive Law School Admission to Ensure Full Representation in the Profession, 40 CAP.
U. L. REv. 71, 98 n.139 (2012).
76. Id.
77. Aronson & McGlone, supra note 73, at 156-57. See also Bibliography of
Empirical Studies, REDUCINGSTEREOTYPETHREAT.ORG (last visited Jul. 17, 2013), http://
www.reducingstereotypethreat.org/bibliography.html (providing a lengthy bibliography of
published studies).
78. Becca R. Levy et al., Association Between Positive Age Stereotypes and
Recovery from Disability in Older Persons, 308 JAMA 1972, 1973 (2012) (considering
both positive and negative stereotypes and concluding that effects were associated with both
kinds).
79. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Stricker, Inquiring About Examinees' Ethnicity and
Sex: Effects on AP Calculus AB Examination Performance, COLLEGEBOARD (Jan. 1, 1998),
available at http://research.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/publications/2012/7/
researchreport-1998-1-inquiring-ethnicity-sex-effects-ap-calculus-ab-exam.pdf (finding no
effect on an examination given to high-schoolers).
80. Annie Murphy Paul, It's Not Me, It's You, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 7, 2012, at SR9.
81. Michael Grunwald, For Obama, Race Remains Elephant in the Room, TIME
(Sept. 15, 2008), http://time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1841109,00.html.
82. Rick Salutin, The Strength It Takes to Just Sit There, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct.
17, 2008, at A19; see also Grunwald supra note 80, at 1 ("White America has shown an
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"felt free to fume and eye roll,"83 while Obama, according to one observer in 2008,
"can't afford to do what white candidates can do-express anger."
Taking time to second-guess one's responses, guard against triggering
thoughts about an angry black man in voters, and add another layer of inhibition
and preparation means that something else has to give-a campaign work day has
little spare time. President Obama's election demonstrated that this stereotype is
not fatal to high political ambitions, but he paid a price in constraint. Sitting
presidents remain political actors, and so winning a second term did not set Obama
as free as his hypothetical white counterpart.
The primary opponent Obama faced in 2008, and later brought into his
cabinet, experienced both less and more constraint. On one hand, Hillary Rodham
Clinton was freer than Barack Obama during the primary to announce with
indignation that "if HIV-AIDS were the leading cause of death of white women
between the ages of 25 and 34, there would be an outraged outcry in this
country.,,8 5 "Outraged" and "outcry" were likely among the words foreclosed to
Obama. On the other hand, Clinton encountered a constraining stereotype dubbed
the Iron Lady. This persona, associated with British prime minister Margaret
Thatcher, pressures a female candidate to eschew "stereotypical feminine traits."8 6
Voters want ladies who aspire to run a country to be iron: According to one review
of the stereotyping Hillary Clinton faced in 2008, "most successful women
politicians" in modem electoral history won office by presenting themselves as
extra tough.8 7
Clinton, who first ran for office as the wife of an outgoing president,
balanced her record on behalf of women and children with hawkishness. She went
out of her way to adopt several pro-military positions," and as a senator she voted
to give advance invasion authorization to a president she opposed.89 Whether
abundant willingness to support no-demands blacks like Tiger Woods, Oprah Winfrey,
Colin Powell and Will Smith, but a race man like Malcolm X would be another story.").
83. Salutin, supra note 82, at A19.
84. Lynda Hurst, Will Soft Bigotry Skew the Vote?, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 25,
2008, at 1.
85. Gregory Scott Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Better Metric: The Role of
Unconscious Race and Gender Bias in the 2008 Presidential Race 24 (Cornell Legal
Studies Research Paper, Working Paper No. 08-007, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1102704&download-yes.
86. Id. at 33-34.
87. Id.
88. Doyle McManus, Letting Others Lead, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011, at A28
(describing Clinton as one of the Obama administration's "hawks" with respect to
intervention in Libya); Susannah Meadows, Hillary's Military Offensive: Clinton's Hawkish
Stance is a Two-Edged Political Sword, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 12, 2005), http://
newsmine.org/content.php?ol=cabal-elite/families/clintons/hillary/clinton-hawkish-stance-
plays-to-military.txt (noting Clinton's support for military bases and reservist health care).
89. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
H.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. (2002). When the AUMF vote proved unpopular with
Democratic primary voters, Clinton had to choose between two paths that both appeared
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Clinton authentically desired war is impossible to know, given the stereotype of
female weakness that pressed her to embrace military aggression.90 If this leader
had to promote bloodshed that she did not want to happen at pain of forfeiting her
future in government, then the constraint of stereotyping in U.S. history has taken
at least one deadly turn.
II. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF STEREOTYPING FOR LEGAL
REMEDIATION
Lexicons, etymology (combine Grepe6q with T6xoq), and scholarly works
offer definitions of the word stereotype that pertain to the project of remedying
what is wrong,91 but are too broad to set a work agenda for courts, legislatures,
lawyers, and litigants. Stereotyping has no agreed-on unitary definition.9 2 It does,
however, have three aspects that give these institutional actors a preliminary sense
of what the law can repair.
A. Harm to Individuals as an Element of the Wrong
This first point emerged in the previous Part under the rubric of constraint
and needs only brief attention here. Having shrugged off an assemblage of
stereotypes related to national origin, political party affiliation, and occupation on
the ground that they do not constrain individuals (enough to matter), we move now
to harm as the raison d'tre of the law. In thinking about harm in this context, the
law ought to begin by taking the vantage point of the target of stereotyping-using
an objective approach, making reference to a reasonable member of the classified
group9-rather than that of stereotypers themselves, who have little incentive to
consider the possibility that they are inflicting injury. Ostensibly neutral outsiders,
whose incentive to think about harm is not much greater, are in a better position to
evaluate whether the law ought to provide recourse, but they too may lack
awareness of harm. Making reference to the perspective of the stereotyped group is
the most informative starting point.
It functions to posit out rather than posit in. Not every stereotype that a
target finds harmful will necessarily deserve law-based condemnation, but a
stereotype that cannot be reasonably understood to cause harm is one that the law
can decline to redress. Accordingly, some instances of stereotyping-the ones that
persons so classified experience as trivial, bland, flattering, or neutralized by an
weak: she could repudiate her vote and thus depict herself as buffeted by a stronger male
politician, President Bush, or affirm it and allow Obama, her rival, to present himself as
uncompromised and independent.
90. In the Senate, Clinton tried to find Iron-Lady middle ground, pushing for an
increase in formal congressional power in warmaking. Her efforts failed. Bruce Ackerman
& Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential
Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 468 (2011).
91. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
92. Id.
93. See Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P.D.)
(inaugurating the objective standard for the common law).
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equivalent or reciprocal generalization-lie outside the bounds of legal
remediation.
B. Unreliable Enough
The possibility that a stereotype contains enough truth to be useful-the
unit of sufficiency sometimes noted metaphorically as the size of a grain or a
kernel94-necessarily complicates the question of what's wrong with stereotyping.
Researchers have long taken an interest in the problem of stereotypes that are
reductive but true enough.95 An accurate negative stereotype offers unambiguous
benefits to stereotypers, who save time and gain reassurance: rejection of another
person protects them. Loss to stereotypers arises only when acceptance of the
stereotyped person, the path they did not take, would have made them better off.
In his study of stereotyping in American law, Frederick Schauer makes a
case for the use of negative, reductive generalizations about classes of people.9 6
Undertaking to defend "decision by categories and by generalizations, even with
the consequent apparent disregard for the fact that decision-making by
generalization often seems to produce an unjust result in particular cases," 9 7
Schauer concludes that human beings cannot live without generalizing98 and that
the contrary imperative, particularization-that is, refraining from grouping things
or people together in an effort to uphold the precept that like cases must be treated
alike99-in a strong form is impossible to honor. Generalization is more than just
an unavoidable ill, however. Schauer deems it morally correct, not just convenient
and cheap, because, inter alia, it functions to lessen the harms occasioned by
"creativity, initiative, and discretion."0 0
His Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes, written shortly after the 2001
terrorist attacks, has in mind the problem of state actors who generalize about
individuals-in particular, men who are or appear to be of Middle Eastern origin-
and then foist baneful consequences on them in the name of security.101 Whether
or not one agrees with Schauer that the harms profiling cause are justified, it is
undoubtedly correct to say that the law cannot avoid detrimental classifications
that lead to unjust results at the margins. The under-eighteen citizen who would
94. RUPERT BROWN, PREJUDICE: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 70 (2d ed. 2010)
("grain of truth"); Blum, supra note 22, at 257 ("kernel of truth").
95. See BROWN, supra note 94, at 70-74; see Lee Jussim et al., The Unbearable
Accuracy of Stereotypes, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION
199, 199 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009); see Lee. J. Jussim et al., Why Study Stereotype
Accuracy and Inaccuracy?, in STEREOTYPE ACCURACY: TOWARD APPRECIATING GROUP
DIFFERENCES 3, 3-4 (Yueh-Ting Lee et al. eds., 1995).
96. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES (2003).
97. Id. at ix.
98. Id. at 75.
99. Id. at 219.
100. Id. at 276.
101. Id. at 183-90.
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make a thoughtful and prudent voter,10 2 the criminal defendant whose conviction
puts him just barely in the range of more time in prison, the pristine oral contract
invalidated because a statute said it had to be reduced to writing, and other persons
and things treated severely by formal applications of legal rules might help support
reconsideration of whatever generalization proves frustrating, but they have no
place in identifying what the law ought to deem wrong with stereotyping.
Whatever is wrong must be narrower than a rationale wide enough to condemn
every generalization that the law imposes.10
Accordingly, just as a harmless stereotype falls outside what's wrong
with stereotyping as a legal category,"0 an accurate enough negative
generalization is not, without more, something that the law ought to stop
condoning. Dividing wrongful from nonwrongful generalization calls for care
about the quality of decision-making. The effort is at least as procedural or
methodological as substantive. For example, the upper age limit for airplane pilots
who work in passenger aviation, codified in federal law, generalizes negatively
about persons older than the statutory maximum,05 but this detrimental
consequence will exemplify wrongful stereotyping only if lawmakers failed to
consider the accuracy of their generalization. 10 6 The question of how much
consideration is enough will, of course, recur. Hard cases fall near the border. The
best standard that can be posited here is "untrue enough," whereby generalization
may be deemed equivalent to a wrongful stereotype if power holders imposed its
detriments with insufficient consideration of whether it is true or inadequate
weighing of its harms in relation to the degree of truth present.
C. Stereotyping Distinguished from Discrimination
If "to stereotype" meant exactly the same thing as "to discriminate," then
it would add no descriptive value to an account of discrimination as misconduct.
American law can live with redundancies in its labels (like the exact overlap of
102. Throughout the world, children experience extraordinarily oppressive
generalization at the hands of the law. BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN
SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE book
jacket (2010) (noting a lack of "dignity, equality, privacy, protection, and voice").
103. In this view, one prominent working definition of stereotype-"a term of art
by which is simply meant any imperfect proxy, any overbroad generalization," Mary Anne
Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns": Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as
a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1447, 1449 (2000)-leaves an issue
unresolved. Proxies about individuals are imperfect almost by their nature and yet the law
aggregates individuals into groups. Professor Case's construct informs what is wrong with
law-based aggregation by gender but does not take on the question of what is wrong with
law-based aggregation of persons simpliciter.
104. See supra Part II.A.
105. Schauer, supra note 96, at 108.
106. The decision to raise the maximum that was in place when Schauer wrote,
from 1960 to 1965, might be evidence of reflection in Congress. See Fair Treatment of
Experienced Pilots Act, Pub. L. No. 110-135, 121 Stat. 1450 (2007) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 44729).
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"issue preclusion" with "collateral estoppel" 10 7) but needs no more of them, and
also should not overlook differences that really exist. To best warrant its place in
the firmament of legal categories, stereotyping ought to have an identity distinct
from the related ill that might be called bigotry or prejudice as well as
discrimination.
Inattention to the possibility of a separate meaning for stereotyping has
generated a superficially simple answer to this Article's question: What's wrong
with stereotyping is what is wrong with unlawful discrimination. Though
attractively terse, this simple answer is more than incorrect: It has confounded
courts and made case law hard to synthesize. Vexations postponed, 08 I explore its
incorrectness here.
Recall the meaning of stereotype as a rigid and platelike cast.109 What
courts and commentators have described as stereotyping or stereotypes can instead
be instances of discrimination or prejudice misconceived and mislabeled. To be
useful to the law-to provide substantive content independent of discrimination-
stereotyping must retain the morpheme of "type."
1. The Center of a Venn Diagram
Stereotyping that is of interest to the law occupies the point of overlap
between two aggregations, here labeled Left Circle and Right Circle. We have
considered Left Circle in connection with stereotypes that do little or no harm:
amorous Frenchmen, rude and lazy store clerks, and the like.110 Stereotypes that do
not harm do not implicate the law. 1 Right Circle contains unlawful prejudice in
all its forms, including discrimination and stereotyping.
llcremi pce Unlawful
li 1 11 m1IN 01 prejudice,
ill] n10t o includingilupliale the Im stereotypes
Stereotypes that implicate the law
107. ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON
ITs THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 11-12 (200 1).
108. See infra Part III.
109. See supra note 9.
110. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
111. See supra Part II.A.
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Should a Venn diagram seem needlessly elaborate to describe a simple
partial overlap, consider the Right Circle confusion present in Supreme Court
cases on alleged age discrimination in retirement plans. In Hazen Paper Company
v. Biggins,112 the Court held that firing a 62-year-old employee a few weeks before
the employee's pension was to have vested did not violate the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA"). Age is a category distinct and severable from
years of service, wrote Justice O'Connor.11 This holding is cogent enough. The
Court went on to suggest, however, that every successful claim under the ADEA
involves a stereotype about older workers:"' Because a "prohibited stereotype
('Older employees are likely to be-)would not have figured in this decision ...
stigma would not ensue," wrote the Court, and so Mr. Biggins had to lose. The
Court returned to this erroneous conflation of stereotyping with discrimination in
Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,116
concluding that a state retirement plan that treated older retirees worse than
disabled retirees did not violate the ADEA because the distinction did not rest on a
stereotype about older workers.1 17
The Venn diagram error in Hazen Paper Co. and Kentucky Retirement
Systems was mistaking the small category of actionable (or "prohibited" 1 )
stereotyping for the large category of prejudice, as illustrated in Right Circle.
Without more, the fragment "[o]lder employees are likely to be " expresses
nothing but prejudgment, presumably negative, about this group. Yet to qualify for
membership in the category of stereotype, a generalization about persons must say
something specific. Solid type, again. Justice O'Connor needed to fill in the clause
at the end of the dash.
Options to finish her sentence are familiar. An employer guilty of
stereotyping might perceive older workers as "doddering but dear," 119 prone to
senile dementia, 12 or incapable of mastering advances in office technology. 1 2 1
Alternatively, an employer might feel simple aversion for these workers. When it
lacks descriptive detail, however, aversion is not a stereotype. It can amount to
prejudice, which when acted upon in the form of workplace detriment can fulfill
the central elements of an employment discrimination claim with no need to
reference stereotyping. But the ADEA-a statute that does not include any form of
112. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
113. Id. at 611.
114. Id. at 610-11.
115. Id. at 612.
116. 554 U.S. 135, 138 (2008).
117. Id. at 146.
118. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 612.
119. Amy J.C. Cuddy & Susan T. Fiske, Doddering but Dear: Process, Content,
and Function in Stereotyping of Older Persons, in AGEISM: STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE
AGAINST OLDER PERSONS 3, 4 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2002).
120. See Robert McCann & Howard Giles, Ageism in the Workplace: A
Communication Perspective, in AGEISM: STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER
PERSONS 163, 188 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2002).
121. See id. at 171.
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the word stereotyping in its text-did not require Walter Biggins to find a
stereotype about older workers that his employer used against him, and the
Kentucky retirement plan could have discriminated against older workers without
stereotyping them.
A retrospective on the Women's Rights Project launched by the American
Civil Liberties Union in 1972 also elides discrimination with stereotyping. Titled
"Fighting Sex Stereotypes in the Law," 122 it summarized litigation successes
achieved by the young Ruth Bader Ginsburg and her ACLU colleagues, some but
not all of which challenged stereotypes held and enforced by law. Ginsburg stated
her working definition of sex stereotyping in an amicus brief: "[A] legislature may
not place all males in one pigeonhole, all females in another, based on assumed or
documented notions about 'the way women or men are. "123 This phrasing does not
define stereotyping, although it is broad enough to include it. Like Justice
O'Connor's "[o]lder employees are likely to be-," it stops before reaching
specifics. ACLU briefs of the 1970s did approach specificity sometimes-
"[b]readwinner was synonymous with father, child tenderer with mother,"124 for
example-but more often they equated sex stereotyping with sex discrimination,
omitting any description of the stereotype they deemed at issue. 125 Other writings
on sex discrimination also object to stereotyping when they mean to denounce the
subordination of women. 126
This word choice probably achieves strategic advantage at the expense of
descriptive accuracy. Nonliberal justices of the Supreme Court have written
decisional law that objects to gender stereotyping. 12 7 Sex-discrimination victories
122. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FIGHTING SEX STEREOTYPES IN THE LAW (Dec.
2012).
123. Id. at 3 (describing this position as "Ginsburg's views on gender stereotyping
that animated the ACLU's litigation" and citing its amicus brief in Craig v. Boren).
124. Id. at 4 (quoting brief filed in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975)). Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) also included a bit of specifics. In
Frontiero, the ACLU persuaded the Supreme Court that a policy codified by Congress of
allowing servicemen to claim their wives as dependents regardless of financial
circumstances, but not allowing servicewomen to do the same when they were in fact
supporting their husband, was unconstitutional. Id. at 678-79. The stereotype adverted to is
that husbands are economically dominant in marriage and wives stay out of the labor force.
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 122, at 3-4 (noting "[c]hallenges to laws
perpetuating the stereotype of men as breadwinners and women as caretakers").
125. See id. at 8-9 (claiming that sex segregation in grade schools is wrong
because it "perpetuates sexual stereotypes"); see id. at 11-12 (describing mistreatment of
pregnant police officers as stereotyping).
126. See, e.g., COOK & CUSACK, supra note 8, at 12-13 (adverting to "a
customary stereotype of women as men's property" in Vanuatu); Suzanne Sangree, Title IX
and the Contact Sport Exemption: Gender Stereotypes in a Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 381, 440 (2000) (claiming that treating contact sports differently from noncontact
sports perpetuates a stereotype that women are inferior).
127. The winners were men. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 731 (2003) (Rehnquist, J.) (adverting to "the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring
for family members is women's work"); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
2013] STEREOTYPING 677
for plaintiffs in the Supreme Court have tended to reference stereotypes, a
phenomenon that may honor "gender as a category of classification"-in other
words, an individual has been put in the wrong box-instead of a system of
subordination. 128 While public opinion on the wrongness of discrimination may
have fallen into retreat, 129 "in modem Western societies stereotyping is frowned
upon."130 At least when gender is concerned, denouncing stereotyping may fare
better in court than denouncing prejudice or discrimination. I have no quarrel with
the tactic. For the sake of clarity, however, it would have been useful to identify
the stereotypes in question.
2. Quick, Stealthy, Unspoken, Plausibly Deniable
Like the distinction between stereotyping on the one hand and
discrimination or prejudice on the other, this second aspect also rests on the
printing-technology metaphor that gave the word stereotype its modem meaning.
What made the "type" morpheme of "stereotype" revolutionary back when
Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press was an extraordinary new power
to disseminate ideas quickly, with little variation inserted by the disseminator.131
Printing technology replicates a text and sends a message with no need for a
human scrivener who might be distracted, careless, or ill intentioned.
The message that stereotyping communicates is prejudice. Stereotyping
is one of the slickest ways that prejudice can spread and thrive. If this message had
to compete for attention without a technology of dissemination and replication, it
would move more slowly and have less impact. Social psychologists report a
double whammy: Stereotypes gain storage extra easily in the human mind and are
extra easy to retrieve without effort. 132 In its modem, post-Lippmann incarnation,
stereotyping makes ready use of a fast generalization.
This phenomenon has appeared more neutral to observers than harmful.
The English anthropologist Robin Fox, for example, praises stereotyping by
likening it to the unreasoned human beliefs about causation that David Hume
729 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) ("NUW's policy of excluding males from admission to the
School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively
woman's job.").
128. Valorie K. Vodjik, Beyond Stereotyping in Equal Protection Doctrine:
Reframing the Exclusion of Womenfrom Combat, 57 ALA. L. REV. 303, 307 (2005).
129. See Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-
Sum Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCH. Sci. 215, 215 (2011); Jennifer
Agiesta & Sonya Ross, Poll: Majority Prejudiced Against Blacks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Oct.
27, 2012) available at http://news.yahoo.conap-poll-majority-harbor-prejudice-against-
blacks-07355 1680--election.html.
130. Blum, supra note 22, at 266.
131. See generally ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN
EARLY MODERN EUROPE (2d ed. 2005).
132. Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really
Fading? The Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139, 1146-
1148 (1995).
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identified in the eighteenth century.133 "f we believe that fire warms or water
refreshes," Hume concluded, "it is only because it costs us too much pains [sic] to
think otherwise."134 Only "custom" or "Nature" or "blind habit" can explain what
people believe about the causation of events by antecedents. 13 5 In the early Star
Trek, Fox recalls, First Officer Spock, half Vulcan and half human, hewed
faithfully to logic. Scriptwriters juxtaposed Vulcan rationality against the jumble
of human intuition and emotion that motivated Spock's colleague Captain Kirk.
Persons who strive to live by Spock-like reason, claims Fox, "can't keep it up for
long and in the end quickly ditch it for prejudice and stereotype."136 On vintage
Star Trek, the not-so-logical Kirk usually bested Spock; off television and on earth,
humanity cherishes and clings to "stereotypical thinking and the attribution of
blame." 137 Fox concludes by endorsing "the idea that prejudice is not a form of
thinking but thinking is a form of prejudice." 138 To live in the world is to
stereotype.
Walter Lippmann had said as much back in 1922, and many who study
stereotyping agree: The world "is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting
for direct acquaintance," 13 9 and so individuals need stereotypes to manage the
complexity that other people manifest and impose. A textbook on cross-cultural
communication repeats "too big, too complex" in its account of why people
stereotype: "Hence," it concludes, "you want to classify and pigeonhole."140
Nimble swiftness, so central to stereotyping, emerges even more dramatically
when one looks for alternative means of expressing a negative generalization.
The mid-twentieth century scholar of prejudice Gordon Allport elaborated
on this point. One "can distinguish between a valid generalization and a
stereotype," wrote Allport, only with "solid data" about "true group
differences." Let us explore one of Allport's specimens of stereotypes, "the
133. Robin Fox, Prejudice and the Unfinished Mind: A New Look at an Old
Failing, 3PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 137, 142 (1992).
134. Id. at 141.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 145.
137. Id. at 148.
138. Id. at 151.
139. LIPPMANN, supra note 10, at 10.
140. LARRY A. SAMOvAR, RICHARD E. PORTER, & EDwIN R. MCDANIEL,
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CULTURES 170 (7th ed. 2011). Consider, for example,
stereotyping of the elderly, a common practice in the United States. Two authors who
disapprove of what they call "ageism" concede that identifying characteristics shared by a
population like this one provides "useful information." Cuddy & Fiske, supra note 118, at 5.
Visitors to a retirement home sort the people they encounter into three cohorts-residents,
staff, and their fellow visitors-with the help of generalizations that amount to stereotypes.
If they could not do so, they would "quickly become confused and overloaded by the
complexities," and prefer to stay away. Id.
141. GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 192 (1954).
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Irish" as "whiskey-soaked." 14 2 Our challenge is to apply "solid data" to this
generalization.
Tedious labor ensues. What does our stereotyper mean to say about "the
Irish"? Is she calling them all alcoholics, heavy drinkers who fall short of that
label, or just over-fond of gathering in pubs? Or is she generalizing about most or
many of the cohort rather than all? Who is Irish enough to count?143 Individuals in
the United States whose ancestors came from both Ireland and other nations might
or might not be covered.
Next comes the question of whether the stereotype is "veridical,""' or
true enough.4 Perhaps "the Irish," assuming they can be identified, qualify as
whiskey-soaked. The national charity Alcohol Action Ireland reports high rates of
per capita consumption of alcohol and binge drinking, as well as a 145% increase
in the average quantity of alcohol drunk in 2010 compared to 1960.16 No
references to whiskey in particular, no transnational comparisons. When an Irish
newspaper ran a story about the stereotype and asked readers to comment, results
were inconclusive. 1 7 The World Health Organization ranks Ireland high in per
capita alcohol consumption but only slightly above nearby Britain," and its data
say that if the Irish are whiskey-soaked, then denizens of most nations in Eastern
Europe are more so.149
142. Id.
143. U.S. Representative Joseph Crowley, for example, born in New York to an
Irish-American father and a mother who immigrated from Northern Ireland, aligned himself
with the slur when he wrote on congressional letterhead to complain about the drunk
stereotype as propounded by a retailer of apparel. Cian Traynor, Ditch the Drink and Find
Some Pride, IRISH TIMEs, Nov. 6, 2012, at 13.
144. BROWN, supra note 94, at 70.
145. It might be possible to investigate drunkenness with reference to ethnic
groups. Research published in the 1980s, for example, concluded that American Jews (even
very assimilated ones with little connection to religious institutions or practices) are
extraordinarily unilikely to be alcoholics. Barry Glassner & Bruce Berg, How Jews Avoid
Alcohol Problems, 45 AM. Soc. REv. 647 (1980); Barry Glassner & Bruce Berg, Social
Locations and Interpretations: How Jews Define Alcoholism, 45 J. STUD. ALCOHOL &
DRUGS 16, 16 (1984).
146. ALCOHOL ACTION IRELAND, How Much Do We Drink?,
http://alcoholireland.ie/alcohol-facts/how-much-do-we-drink/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).
147. Michael Freeman, Poll: Are 'Drunken' Stereotypes About Irish People a
Problem?, THEJOURNAL.IE (2012) http://www.thejournal.ie/poll-are-stereotypes-about-irish-
people-a-problem-374773-Mar2012/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2013). Pertinent to this Article's
thesis was one reference to constraint: "I lived in Oz for a year and some Australian
landlords refused to rent their properties out to Irish people for that very stereotype sorry
mate but the stereotype is sabotaging the Irish reputation abroad," wrote a reader. Marie
Egan, Comment to Poll: Are 'Drunken' Stereotypes About Irish People a Problem?,
THEJOURNAL.IE (June 3, 2012).
148. WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL STATUS REPORT ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH
273-77 (2011).
149. Id.
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In contrast to a stereotype, the slow, ponderous mode of negative
generalization keeps the generalizer and the generalized-about on a more level
playing field. Persons who assert a negative generalization cannot leverage the
strength of familiarity without a stereotype. When they have to drone that "X
people are more likely to . . ." and add qualifiers, rather than whip out a phrase
associated positively with humor, popular culture, and social acceptance, they
must toil to press their point. Forced to speak literally with no help from a glib
clich6, defenders of a negative generalization like "whiskey-soaked" open
themselves up to an equally literal and leaden challenge, generating debate instead
of a quip. They drive away all but the most earnest listeners. They have no sound
bite. Without stereotyping as an accelerant, they slow down.
Another utility of stereotyping as a technology of prejudice is its ability to
deny-and also lessen-individual human agency as a source of harm.
"Stereotyping" in gerund form builds on a verb, here a transitive verb that implies
a subject and object. For example, one might claim that "Norwegians stereotype
Finns." If they really do so, however, what is attributable to an individual (here,
one of the "Norwegians") is occluded by the collective nature of the action.
No individual can invent and disseminate a new stereotype on her own.
The most anyone can do by way of stereotyping is to articulate the stereotype in
clear terms-no hinting, no equivocation, no irony-and make a detrimental
decision about someone else that the stereotyper ascribes to the explanatory force
of the generalization. This maximal version of stereotyping will rarely occur.
Foremost, stereotypes can flourish with their infirmities (and even the fact that
they are stereotypes) undetected by individuals who harbor, express, and rely on
them. "Finns are X" may be less veridical than "heifers are female cattle,"
"peanuts contain allergens," or "metal containers don't belong in microwave
ovens," but in structure the sentences look and sound alike. When a stereotype is
trusted and spoken, odds are that the truster-speaker has little consciousness that
stereotyping is what she just did.150
Moreover, the truism that prejudice is bad encourages individuals to think
of themselves as impelled by motives other than bigotry.5 Stereotyping as
understood in this Article-harmful, negative, reductive-manifests as prejudice
when it is detected. But individuals do not think of themselves as prejudiced,152
and so they do not perceive themselves as lending strength to a bigoted stereotype.
Plausible deniability, the old Cold War notion of making blame harder to
ascribe by intentionally withholding information from political leaders before they
150. Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 321 (1987); Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot:
Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REv. 155, 209 (2005).
151. MICHAEL BILLIG, IDEOLOGY AND OPINION: STUDIES IN RHETORICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 20 (1991).
152. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American
Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1258, 1277-78 (1992) (noting that "racism of other times and places does stand out, does
strike us as glaringly and appallingly wrong").
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commit controversial acts,153 characterizes the relation between stereotyping and
bigotry. Stereotyping muffles the consciousness of invidious discrimination that
individuals need in order to feel responsible for having classified others unjustly. It
interprets complicated, neutral, or ambiguous behavior from the stereotyped cohort
as easy to understand and worthy of quick condemnation. It answers the question
of how to evaluate another person while suppressing, in its swift and sometimes
merry way, the formation of a judgment that could have come out differently.
Stereotyping offers not only a shortcut to a prejudiced conclusion but the erasure
of its tracks to this destination. A stereotyper might, if asked, testify truthfully to
her unbigoted intentions. She would have to second-guess herself to challenge
what she decided.
Stereotyping is a winged messenger: It flies fast. By its nature it escapes
accountability. The next Part turns to the exception to this generalization.
III. THE FRACTION OF AMERICAN STEREOTYPING THAT IS
ACTIONABLE
A tiny percentage of individuals harmed by stereotyping have found relief
in American courts. Most of these victories occurred in the field of employment
discrimination. Even though the United States Code contains not one black letter
prohibition of stereotyping,"' courts have construed a (limited) cause of action for
this wrong.
A. Price Waterhouse, a Predecessor, and Its Progeny
That stereotyping might violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is a
notion first accepted by a court in 1971. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
approved a claim of wrongful termination and added a reference to stereotyping. In
"forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex,"
declared the court, "Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."15 5
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. did not name or describe the stereotype
that had fostered disparate treatment for the plaintiff, but a contemporary magazine
story may have spotted it. Ascribed by another airline to "a lovely smiling
stewardess," 156 the slogan "Fly Me" suggests that Mary Burke Sprogis, a United
153. EVAN THOMAS, ROBERT KENNEDY: His LIFE 123 (2000) (describing the
concept as empowering the Central Intelligence Agency in the Kennedy administration).
154. A search of the Westlaw database USC found that the only references to
stereotypes or stereotyping in federal statutes either reference printing technology, 44
U.S.C. § 505 (2012), or authorize government agencies to study the phenomenon of
stereotyping based on race or sex. 20 U.S.C. § 2501(3) (2012).
155. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
156. The Nation: Fly Me, TIME (Nov. 15, 1971), available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,903213,00.html. The National
Organization for Women promptly picketed: "GO FLY YOURSELF NATIONAL," said
one placard, naming the airline. Gilligan Newton-John, The Groovy Age of Travel #3: A
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flight attendant fired immediately after getting married, had veered from a persona.
If "Fly Me" breathes an intelligible hint about licentious, accessible single-girl
stewardesses, then becoming the wife of one man meant that Sprogis forfeited her
job when she tacitly declared herself unavailable for sexual fantasy-consumption
by the flying public.
Eighteen years later, a clearer instance of the phenomenon reached the
Supreme Court. This case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,15 7 remains the landmark
in decisional law about stereotyping as an actionable wrong. Ann Branigar
Hopkins had built an extraordinarily strong employment record as a senior
manager in Price Waterhouse, a large accounting finn.158 In 1982 she sought
promotion to partnership. After Price Waterhouse stonewalled for two years,
neither granting nor denying her application, Hopkins brought an action alleging
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
At a bench trial, Judge Gerhard Gesell examined personnel records that
were replete with gender-based condemnations of Ann Hopkins. Supervisors
described her as "macho,". "somewhat masculine," "a lady using foul language"
who "overcompensated for being a woman," as well as someone in need of "a
course at charm school." 159 One evaluator suggested that Hopkins could improve
her partnership chances if she would "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 160
The Supreme Court determined that these criticisms, accompanied by an
adverse employment action, supported a claim under Title VII. Justice Brennan
used Sprogis to support his conclusion that sex stereotyping in the workplace has
"legal relevance" because it generates disparate treatment. 16 1 The lower court
decision in Price Waterhouse offered more support for that hypothesis: Judge
Gesell had written that "at least two other women candidates" who had applied for
partnership had been rejected for trying "to be 'one of the boys"' or putting their
supervisors in mind of the oft-caricatured gangster Ma Barker.162 Supervisors at
this firm disapproved of women who appeared to them "curt, brusque and
abrasive," without considering whether gender bias influenced their assessment,163
and Price Waterhouse took no steps to keep this bias out of personnel evaluations.
Time Before the Turbulence, RETROSPACE (Nov. 16, 2009), http://my-retrospace.blogspot.
con/2009/1 1/mini-skirt-monday-27-time-before.html.
157. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
158. Id. at 233-34. Today the successor entity known as PricewaterhouseCoopers
is even bigger, ranked seventh on a list of the ten largest private companies in the United
States. See Forbes, 10 Largest Private Companies in America, FORBES.COM (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/11/01/top-10-private-cargill-business-private-companies-10-
largest slide 8.html.
159. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 250.




The plurality appeared to have in mind, although it did not describe, a
collision of stereotypes that became the undoing of Ann Hopkins at Price
Waterhouse. "An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch
22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not,"
Brennan wrote. 164 "Title VII lifts women out of this bind." 165 Justice Stevens, who
as a judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had dissented in Sprogis,
signed this plurality opinion. 16 6
Price Waterhouse generated extensive doctrinal progeny. 16 Part of its
impact took form in new successes for plaintiffs. These wins in court do not tell
the full story of this precedent, which has disappointed workers and academic
observers over the years, but they are central to its record.
The first doctrinal innovation that Price Waterhouse begat was an
application of its condemnation of stereotyping to the context of sexual
harassment. Three years earlier, the Supreme Court had ruled that sexual
harassment constituted sex discrimination under Title VII. 168 Lower courts merged
the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson with Price Waterhouse to rule that
harassment of an employee based on the employee's noncompliance with gender
stereotypes is actionable under the statute. 169 Student plaintiffs have prevailed in
Title IX actions as well when they alleged harassment at school based on their
noncompliance with stereotypes. 170
The second judicial innovation, which overlaps with the first, was to
deem actionable the harassment of a man or boy based on his perceived
effeminacy.171 Courts describe what these plaintiffs experience as stereotyping. In
Doe v. City of Belleville, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
164. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 231.
167. Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family
Conflicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297, 1316 (2012); see also Stone, supra note 18, at 634
(calling the decision "overcited"); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex
Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 760 (2013) (using the progeny
metaphor).
168. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
169. Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1222-
24 (D. Or. 2002) (involving a female plaintiff); see Medina v. Income Support Div., 413
F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (involving a female plaintiff); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (involving a male plaintiff); Jones v. Pac.
Rail Sers., 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 90 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (male plaintiff).
170. Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 364, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 965
(D. Kan. 2005) (applying this reasoning to a Title IX claim); Montgomery v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092-93 (D. Minn. 2000).
171. A leading early work in this literature presciently noted the importance of
effeminate male plaintiffs to gender stereotyping in court. Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1995).
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two boys who were harassed at school, citing Price Waterhouse's condemnation of
stereotyping.172 This form of harassment, where both victims and perpetrators are
male, combines Price Waterhouse-style stereotyping with conduct condemned in
another Supreme Court case, Oncale v. Sundowner Services, Inc.,173 which found
same-sex harassment actionable under Title VII. Whether the Supreme Court
agreed with the City of Belleville holding is obscure, but the Court did note it.171
Another leading decision, Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 175 held
that same-sex harassment based on gender stereotypes is actionable under Title
VII.
The boldest judicial application of Price Waterhouse has extended
protection to transgender employees who lost or risked their jobs when they
presented themselves as newly female. Several transgender litigants had sought
redress for employment discrimination before Price Waterhouse and failed; the
Court's condemnation of stereotyping helped a small number of them to prevail. 176
The earliest victory for a plaintiff, Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio,17 7 interpreted the
threat to Jimmy Smith's job as a firefighter, which arose after Smith told his
supervisors about having gender identity disorder and intending to transition from
a man to a woman, as an instance of "[s]ex stereotyping based on a person's
gender non-conforming behavior." Schroer v. Billington granted defendant
Library of Congress's motion to dismiss on all claims except the one based on sex
stereotyping, which the court found well supported in the record. 179 Smith and
Schroer brought their stereotyping claims under Title VII. Another court found
stereotyping actionable for a transgender plaintiff who sought relief under the
Equal Protection Clause.1 so
B. Open Questions, Tentatively Answered
Hard cases make bad law, goes the aphorism;"' easy cases like Price
Waterhouse make difficulties of their own.182 Price Waterhouse was an easy case
in that although its thirteen judges had their differences about the interpretation of
172. 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
173. 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
174. The Court vacated City of Belleville a few days after deciding Oncale and
ordered reconsideration in light of its new decision but said no more. See Moore v. USG
Corp., 94 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P44,316 (N.D. Miss. 2011); the City of Belleville settled
with the Doe plaintiffs before a new decision could issue on remand. Yuracko, supra note
163, at 764 n.22.
175. 256 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2001).
176. Mary Kristen Kelly, Note, (Trans)forming Traditional Interpretations of
Title VII: "Because of Sex" and the Transgender Dilemma, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
219, 227 (2010).
177. 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004).
178. Id. at 575.
179. 525 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2007).
180. Glennv. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
181. Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 406 (Exch.).
182. Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REv. 89, 89-90 (1990).
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precedent, the application of federal procedural rules, who had various burdens of
proof, and who ought to have prevailed in the end, all but one agreed that Price
Waterhouse had discriminated against Ann Hopkins on the basis of sex.183 Years
of business-getting at Price Waterhouse gave Hopkins a full dossier. The numbers
of what she achieved were unambiguous. Her supervisors had written equally
unambiguous expressions of their gender bias into the file. Personnel
recordkeeping this open-candor to the point of recklessness-was rare even in
the 1980s. It cannot be expected to recur, and so even though Price Waterhouse
came out favorably for a plaintiff, its facts necessarily set the bar high for
successor-litigants who bring more ambiguous experiences to court.
A dissent in Price Waterhouse said that "it is important to review the
actual holding of today's decision,"" and this position, in hindsight, appears wise.
Congress went on to "review the actual holding" before passing pertinent
amendments to the Civil Rights Act in 1991.186 Hundreds of judicial decisions and
dozens of law review articles have parsed Price Waterhouse. Many of these
writings focus on stereotyping as unlawful, harmful conduct. These efforts have
not been fully availing: Lower courts who read Price Waterhouse "have come up
short," one observer concluded after reviewing more than two decades of case
law. "' Readers of the decision still wonder what the Court intended to hold.188
Price Waterhouse-related questions continue to fill case law and
scholarship. These questions include but are not limited to "what it means to
'stereotype,' how stereotyping translates into impermissible action, and why
stereotyping is considered nefarious and capable of fomenting discrimination." 189
Below are some of mine with provisional answers linked to the thesis of this
Article.
183. The dissent found that "Hopkins plainly presented a strong case both of her
own professional qualifications and of the presence of discrimination in Price Waterhouse's
partnership process;" what was missing, to three Justices, was proof that "sex discrimination
caused the adverse decision." In other words, Hopkins had failed to eliminate the possibility
that Price Waterhouse had nondiscriminatory reasons to deny her partnership. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
184. See NANCY LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAW 213
(1998).
185. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 280 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
186. The 1991 Amendments touched on stereotyping only indirectly. They
provided that mixed-motive employment discrimination, where factors other than "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin" also motivated the adverse action, suffices to
establish a violation of Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat
1071 (Nov. 21, 1991) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
187. Stone, supra note 18, at 593.
188. For a more constructive expression of this point, see Martha Chamallas, Of
Glass Ceilings, Sex Stereotypes, and Mixed Motives: The Story of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES 307, 307 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie
M. Wildman eds., 2011) (observing that the decision "has had many lives").
189. Stone, supra note 18, at 593.
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1. Is the condemnation of stereotyping in Price Waterhouse (and its progenitor
Sprogis) a holding or dicta?
In both Price Waterhouse and Sprogis, litigants complained in federal
court about adverse employment actions. Price Waterhouse had responded
unfavorably to the applications Ann Hopkins had made for partnership. United Air
Lines fired Mary Burke Sprogis consistent with its written policy, held in place
from the mid-1930s to 1968, that female flight attendants had to begin their
employment unmarried and remain unmarried while working in this position.190
Both women claimed that their employers discriminated against them on the basis
of their sex. Their claims fit easily into the center of Title VII without stereotyping.
Failure to be promoted and termination occupy the heart of adverse employment
action as stated in section 703 of the statute, which lists at the top of its Unlawful
Employment Practices both "discharge," which happened to Sprogis, and
discrimination with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment," which includes partnership rejection that Hopkins experienced.1 91
In both decisions, the courts concluded that stereotyping had inflicted
harm but left open the question of how much this conclusion mattered to the
outcome. Unlike Mary Burke Sprogis, Ann Hopkins had pressed a point about
stereotyping. She engaged a prominent social psychologist to testify at trial that
this phenomenon "played a major determining role" in the Price Waterhouse
partnership decision,1 92 and what Hopkins said about stereotyping proved central
to her victory in the district court.193 Yet even for this famous litigant, stereotyping
was the means to an end rather than an end in itself. "The plaintiff must show that
the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision," Justice Brennan
wrote. "In making this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that
gender played a part." 194
From here, the condemnations of stereotyping in both cases appear to rest
outside the holding. The portion of the plurality opinion that begins "We
hold. . ."195 recited a rule about the burden of proof in mixed-motive
discrimination claims. 196 The decision also held that Judge Gesell's decision to
admit testimony about stereotyping was not clearly erroneous.197 But unlike the
190. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1971). In
1968, following negotiations with a union, United agreed to drop the no-marriage rule for
female flight attendants but insisted that "any Stewardess who shall hereafter become
pregnant shall have her services with the Company permanently severed as a Stewardess."
Id. at n.2.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
192. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
193. Id. at 463-64 (noting the trial court's identification of several weaknesses in
Hopkins's claim).
194. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
195. Id. at 258.
196. Id. Congress mooted that part of the decisionby codifying a pro-plaintiff rule
in 1991.
197. See Philip McGough, Same-Sex Harassment: Do Either Price Waterhouse or
Oncale Support the Ninth Circuit's Holding in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises,
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other big Title VII decision of its decade, the unanimously decided Meritor
Savings Bank, Brennan's Price Waterhouse opinion lacked the votes to make any
conduct newly actionable. Jurisprudential sources have described plurality
opinions like Price Waterhouse-signed by four judges and accompanied by
concurrences in the result only-as comparable to concurrences or dissents: "their
voices do not carry the authority of the Supreme Court as an institution."198
Tentative answer: Dicta, though important and generative.
2. How do stereotyping and actionable discrimination interrelate?
The Price Waterhouse plurality's lack of clarity on whether its
condemnation of stereotyping was holding or dicta extends into this next question
left open by the Court. As noted, Brennan characterized an employer's
"stereotyped remarks" as evidence of sex discrimination.199 Consistent with the
framework presented in Part II, this judicial construct considers stereotyping in
functional terms.
Tentative answer: Stereotyping is a technology of actionable
discrimination, a mode by which injustice gains effect.200
3. What does it mean to stereotype?201
Justice Brennan did not define this word.202 More strikingly, neither did
Sprogis, which even attributed an anti-stereotyping agenda to Congress. 203 The
first two Parts of this Article have given my answer to the question. For law, I
argued in Part I, the "perfect stereotype"204 is that a group is by nature born a
slave. When members of the group do what they please they are not free persons,
just unruly. Variations on the theme of constraint-worthiness pervade American
stereotyping, as I outlined above and will develop below.205 Part II, recognizing
that no formal definition is likely ever to be codified, identified three elements that
bear on whether legal institutions ought to condemn particular instances of
stereotyping.
4. "When should courts apply Price Waterhouse?" 2 06
This question makes reference to employment discrimination, a domain
that this Article built on in this Part but will soon leave behind. It also pertains to
Inc. That Same-Sex Harassment Based on Failure to Conform to Gender Stereotypes is
Actionable?, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 206, 207 (2004).
198. Id. at 216-17 (citations omitted).
199. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
200. See supra Part II.C.2.
201. Kerry Lynn Stone asked this question. See Stone, supra note 18, at 593.
202. Id.
203. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971);
supra note 154 and accompanying text.
204. See supra Part I.
205. See supra Part I; infra Part IV.
206. Stone asked this question too. Stone, supra note 18, at 634.
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any legal treatment of stereotyping. Implicitly paraphrasing her question as "When
plaintiffs seek to benefit from the Price Waterhouse plurality opinion on
stereotyping, should courts accept these uses of the precedent?" Kerry Lynn Stone
proposes that courts ask first whether a stereotype is in play and then, if the answer
to that question is yes, whether a nexus links the stereotype to an adverse action.20
My tentative answer here is to commend this framework.
The deeper question is how to distinguish stereotyping's winners and
losers in the courts. Since the issuance of Price Waterhouse, numerous plaintiffs
have obtained the benefit of its holding-that is, a judicial conclusion that the
defendant's conduct constituted stereotyping in violation of Title VII. Others
sought this benefit and failed to gain it. The challenge of explaining why some
employers' gender-presentation demands are cast as unlawful stereotyping, while
others encounter tolerance and indulgence to the detriment of plaintiffs in court,
has proved formidable.
Rather than answer the question as paraphrased, I note the stakes. Even
Stone's seemingly straightforward query about whether a stereotype is in play will
not yield definitive answers, in part because stereotypes in the workplace require
context to be intelligible. Take "charm school," for instance, where one of Ann
Hopkins's supervisors said she needed to go.208 A reference to charm can be
gender neutral. Some men have it.209 "Charm school," however, refers
unambiguously to feminine artifice.210 Only girls and women get told they ought to
enroll there. All thirteen Price Waterhouse judges understood the gender subtext
present-even Stephen Williams of the D.C. Circuit, who thought Ann Hopkins
should have lost.211 But is charm school, or needing to enroll in charm school, a
stereotype? Whether this message matters to the outcome depends on whether one
thinks Ann Hopkins had suffered unlawful discrimination at work in the first
place.
5. Why did Justice Brennan choose to focus on stereotyping?
This question builds on the holding-or-dicta question above, but does not
require acceptance of my "dicta" answer. Even if Price Waterhouse holds that
stereotyping by an employer without more violates Title VII, Justice Brennan
could have upheld the trial judgment in favor of Ann Hopkins without any
reference to stereotyping. My tentative answer is that a condemnation of
207. Id. at 635-55.
208. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
209. See, e.g., MADAME D'AULNOY, THE BLUE BIRD (1697) (featuring as hero Le
Roi Charmant, the Charming King); OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY (1890)
(referencing Prince Charming).
210. See Melissa M. Beck, Note, Fairness on the Field: Amending Title VII to
Foster Greater Female Participation in Professional Sports, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
241, 248-49 (1994) (observing that charm school was imposed on female professional
baseball players in the 1940s).
211. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Williams, J., dissenting).
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stereotyping is appealing. William Brennan, a good vote counter,2 12 probably knew
it.213
Evidence that judges like the concept of stereotyping is copious. Consider
the emergence of a judicial demand that age-discrimination plaintiffs identify a
stereotype that hanned them, even though the statute imposes no such burden;214
the acceptance of stereotyping as sufficient to fulfill the near-requirement, also
judge made, that Title VII plaintiffs prove intentional discrimination;215 and the
rise of stereotyping as a strong legal claim post-Price Waterhouse, in an era when
plaintiffs fared worse elsewhere in employment law.216 As Valorie Vodjik has
argued, a complaint that one has suffered from the application of a stereotype
implicitly eschews radicalism. It says, in effect, "I was put in a wrong category," a
much more conservative protest than a claim alleging subordination.217 If the
virtues of stereotyping as a technology of prejudice include plausible deniability
and independence from human agency, as I have argued, then stereotyping offers a
gentle label for misconduct. A factfinder can deem stereotyping actionable without
applying blame to a person.
So understood, stereotyping in the workplace is not even evidence of
wrongdoing in the sense of pointing factfinders toward one conclusion or another,
but instead is a post hoc reinforcement of a position already taken. In
contemporary case law it has become the pro-plaintiff counterpart of the pro-
defendant "isolated incident," a term that does not refer to the number one, nor
even legal insufficiency, but rather to a degree too small to impress the
factfinder.218 Courts and scholars denounce stereotyping when they mean to
denounce unlawful discrimination or prejudice. 2 19 Their embracing of the word
attests to its force. Observers who approve of a claim will focus on whatever
stereotype is present in the story. Observers who believe a claimant suffered no
actionable discrimination will ignore whatever stereotyping the plaintiff relates.
Such an allegation would to them be idle and trivial, like saying the French are
212. See Lithwick, supra note 37.
213. See supra note 126 (recalling decisional law about stereotyping by Justices
O'Connor and Rehnquist). Brennan did not win Rehnquist's vote in Price Waterhouse, but
near the end of his career Rehnquist published a firm condenmation of stereotyping. Nev.
Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003) (ascribing a policy as "not
attributable to any differential physical needs of men and women, but rather to the pervasive
sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women's work").
214. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
215. See Ann C. McGinley, ;Viva La Evolucion! Recognizing Unconscious
Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 417 (2000).
216. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
217. See Vodjik, supra note 128; see also Case, supra note 103, at 1467-68
(reviewing Supreme Court decisional law invalidating "irrebuttable presumptions" about
groups of individuals that was received as uncontroversial, perhaps even apolitical).
218. I elaborate on this point in Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with
Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 449 (1997) and Anita Bernstein, Civil Rights Violations =
Broken Windows: De Minimis Curet Lex, 62 FLA. L. REv. 895, 922-25 (2010) [hereinafter
Bernstein, Civil Rights Violations].
219. See supra Part II.C.
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glad to die for love and delight in fighting duels.220 Stereotyping has little bearing
on a claim of discrimination unless one is inclined to accept the claim. For a
factfinder so inclined, this label as conclusion can achieve a smooth repair.
IV. How LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS BUTTRESS WHAT IS
WRONG: EXAMPLES
"The perfect stereotype" of "by nature formed a slave" generates an array
of constraints, whereby stereotypes help to curb the unruliness ascribed to groups.
Here I continue to press a distinction between prejudice on one hand and
stereotyping on the other. Prejudice is the theory: It declaims the categorical
inferiority of a group. Stereotyping is the technology. It enforces prejudice against
groups by curbing the freedom of group members. Stereotyping fends off threats
of disruption; it uses constraint to defend established distributions of power.
In this perspective, the legal remediation of stereotyping available
through employment discrimination actions, discussed in the last Part, becomes an
outlier. More often, the law will abet and strengthen stereotyping. Five examples
in this Part illustrate the phenomenon of constraining stereotypes as they are
supported, rather than resisted or redressed, by American law and legal
institutions.
A. State-Enforced Impulse Control, Mainly But Not Only of African-American
Men
Criminal law understands, sorts, and sanctions violent conduct under the
influence of two familiar stereotypes. If black men are angry and women of all
racial groups crazy, then the violence these persons initiate will be senseless,
erratic, and unreasonable. Crediting stereotypes helps to condemn physically
harmful behaviors by a woman or an African-American man, and condone the
same behaviors when a white man engages in them.
Impulse control brings desirable consequences, of course. One might note
what is right, so to speak, with stereotyping a potentially violent person as crazy or
angry. Whenever this stereotype discourages individuals from resorting to bodily
attack, people at risk of getting hurt become safer, costs of injuries to the larger
society go down, and vulnerable observers like children gain instructive
demonstrations of how to express anger without inflicting physical pain on another
person. The problem is unequal treatment that follows from a counterpart to the
stereotype. If femaleness or blackness makes a person crazy or angry, then the
absence of these traits makes him rational, or his behaviors reasonable and
comprehensible.
The notion that violent conduct might be reasonable and comprehensible
underlies self-defense, the classic justification of Anglo-American criminal law.
Self-defense posits that inflicting harm on another person can, under the right
conditions, constitute admirable behavior. Whereas an excuse like intoxication or
duress merely tolerates injurious conduct, a justification like self-defense extols
220. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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it.22 1 Unstereotyped white men who commit violent acts and claim this privilege
enjoy an apparent benefit of the doubt.
The much-reported death of an African-American teenager in 2012 offers
222
a fraught illustration. George Zimmerman killed Trayvon Martin inside a gated
community and told Florida police that he had shot Martin to protect himself.
Responding to protests about the lack of an arrest, the local chief of police spoke at
a press conference. "Mr. Zimmerman has made the statement of self-defense," he
said. "Until we can establish probable cause to dispute that, we don't have the
grounds to arrest him." 223 Based on a 911 tape recording, however, the officers
who had declined to make an arrest knew that Zimmerman, armed with a semi-
automatic Kel-Tec pistol as he walked through the gated community, had initiated
an encounter with Martin on hostile terms. 2 24
The violence that emerged suggested self-defense as a justification less
for the assailant than for the dead youth, who had been walking unarmed back
from a convenience store when a stranger concluded he looked suspicious and
questioned him aggressively. Case law holds that provokers of confrontations
cannot claim self-defense unless they can establish that they had attempted to leave
the fight before it escalated. 225 The retreat exception could have been present when
Trayvon Martin died. George Zimmerman might have tried to disengage. If not,
other circumstances might support the acquittal he won.226 What matters for
present purposes is the benefit of the doubt on justification that a person who was
not African American received after he killed an African-American teenager.227
This outcome at least aligns with, although one cannot say with certainty that it
was caused by, a stereotype of black men and boys as violent and dangerous.
At around the same time as the death of Trayvon Martin, a Florida judge
sentenced an African-American defendant named Marissa Alexander, who had
221. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 199, 242-43 (1982).
222. "If I had a son, he'd look like Trayvon," said President Obama when the
news broke, making a rare public reference to race. Coates, supra note 31.
223. Paul Koring, Killing of Black Florida Teen Puts 'Stand Your Ground' Law
on Trial, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
world/worldview/killing-of-black-florida-teen-puts-stand-your-ground-law-on-
trial/article536252/.
224. A 911 dispatcher had asked Zimmerman if he was following Martin; when
Zimmerman said yes, the dispatcher replied, "We don't need you to do that." Lizette
Alvarez & Michael Cooper, Prosecutor Files Charge of 2nd-Degree Murder in Shooting of
Martin, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 2012, at Al.
225. Commonwealth v. Philistin, 53 A.3d 1, 12 (Pa. 2012); Hart v. State, 637 So.
2d 1329, 1336-38 (Miss. 1994); Blanchette v. State, No. 40A05-0806-CR-341, 2008 WL
4927056 at *1, *2 (Ind. App. Nov. 19, 2008) (unpublished table decision).
226. See Jackie Gingrich Cushman, Why Are We So Divided on Zimmerman
Verdict?, DAYTONDAILYNEWS, Jul. 26, 2013, at A9 (exploring responses to this acquittal).
227. Zimmerman, though of multiracial origin, was the whiter of the two. See
generally Manuel Roig-Franzia et al., Who is George Zimmerman?, WASH. POST, Mar. 23,
2012, at Al (discussing Zimmerman's background).
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fired what she described as a warning shot in self-defense into a wall in her home.
Alexander was reacting to a battering husband who had just threatened to kill her.
Nobody was hit; Alexander had no criminal record; the Florida "stand your
ground" version of self-defense that protected George Zimmerman, enacted in
2005 and permitting deadly force with no duty to retreat, applied to her actions.
After a jury found Alexander guilty she received a twenty-year prison sentence, a
mandatory mimmum.228 In an interview the state attorney shrugged: Alexander
"didn't show much of her being remorseful," nor of "being a peaceful person;"
Alexander had fired a gun with two children in the house, a dangerous act 229-as if
the house, terrorized by a man who admitted in a deposition that he had beaten
Alexander and abused "all five of his babies' mamas except one," 230 had been safe
before she undertook to defend herself.
Because self-defense claims stand or fall based on particulars, it is hard to
draw an inference about groups from the divergent experiences of two individuals
like George Zimmerman and Marissa Alexander. Unruliness as ascribed by
stereotyping does, however, predict two consequences for self-defense claims-
one for killers and one for persons killed. Killers are more likely to prevail when
they are white or male rather than African American or female, because the actions
of white persons and men are more likely to be perceived as orderly. As for
persons killed, African-American men combine the unruliness of the angry-crazy
stereotype with perceived or real physical strength not attributed to women, and so
killing them in self-defense is especially likely to look reasonable.231 Evidence
supports both predictions,232 and a 2012 review of Florida case results found that
"stand your ground" stances exonerated killers especially effectively when the
person killed was black.233
228. Trymaine Lee, Marissa Alexander Sentenced: Florida Mom Who Shot at




231. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 781 (1994).
232. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND
THE LAW ON TRIAL 206 (1988) (noting successful references to race in a notorious claim of
self-defense by a white male shooter); LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY
BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SOCIETY RESPONDS 207 (1989) (noting that black women
fare worse than white women when claiming self-defense in homicide prosecutions);
Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 237, 249-65 (2008) (describing gender bias in judicial interpretations of the
doctrine).
233. Kris Hundley et al., Florida 'Stand Your Ground' Law Yields Some Shocking
Outcomes Depending on How Law is Applied, TAMPA BAY TIMES, June 1, 2012, 1A
(finding that when the killed person was black, 73% of the killers received no penalty, but
when the killed person was white, this success rate went down to 59%). "Stand your
ground" played an ambiguous role in the trial of George Zimmerman for the killing of
Trayvon Martin. Randy Schultz, Stand Your Ground?, RECORD-J., Aug. 4, 2013, at D2
(noting that this phrase "was not invoked at trial but influenced the jury instructions").
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As the federal appellate judge Nathaniel Jones has argued in an essay
about this privilege, self-defense in the nineteenth century functioned to safeguard
the prerogative of white men to control unruly men of color. Prior to the
emancipation of enslaved persons in the United States, Jones notes, "[t]he usual
pretext for killing a slave [by a slave holder was] that the slave has offered
,,234
resistance. Provocation, another doctrinal support for the choice to kill a
person, "began as a common law doctrine about men defending their honor"
against disruptors.235 Violence when condoned this way appears necessary to
repair "breaches of honour" and thus restores, rather than threatens, order.236
There is no reason to suppose that men in contrast to women, or white
persons in contrast to black persons, should enjoy an enlarged privilege to deploy
violence at their discretion. Neither men nor white persons have shown any
propensity for inflicting harm in uncommonly prudent or defensible ways. White
men are massively overrepresented in the grisly roster of mass shooters.237
According to the FBI, men also dominate the ranks of serial killers, and a large
proportion of these men are white. 238
When a white man kills, he is more likely than his African-American or
female counterpart to receive sympathy from observers who say, in effect, that
they can relate. He'd been spurned; he'd suffered trauma; 23 9 he deserves the
234. Nathaniel R. Jones, For Black Males and American Society-the Unbalanced
Scales of Justice: A Costly Disconnect, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994) (quoting FREDERICK
DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF AN AMERICAN SLAVE 205 (1973)).
235. Caroline Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the
United States, Canada and Australia, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 27, 31 (2006)
(citing Bernard J. Brown, The Demise of Chance Medley and the Recognition of
Provocation as a Defence to Murder in English Law, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 310, 312-13
(1963)).
236. Id. at 31 n.17.
237. Mark Follman et al., A Guide to Mass Shootings in America, MOTHER JONES
(Feb. 27, 2013, 7:32 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-
map (examining 61 mass murders that were carried out with firearms in the last 30 years).
238. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SERIAL MURDER: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
FOR INVESTIGATORS (2008), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/serial-murder/serial-murder-july-2008-pdf. Unlike a mass shooting, a
serial killing can escape detection, especially if victims are elderly or ill, and so women
might be commiitting countless homicides that never manifest as crimes. Accordingly I do
not claim that women are less deadly than men, only that men have not manifested any
greater competence than women to deploy violence in socially useful ways. Nor have white
persons as compared with African-American persons manifested such competence. On the
race of serial killers, see id. at 4 ("The racial diversification of serial killers generally
mirrors that of the overall U.S. population.").
239. A mass shooting in 1999 brought out sympathetic rationales in droves:
The main one was that [the two white male perpetrators] were the
victims of brutal high school bullies. They were social outcasts,
persecuted by the jocks and the popular kids. But there were other
theories afloat: they'd fallen in with a sick Goth subculture; they were
neglected by their families; they were influenced by violent video
games; they were misfits who could find no place in a conformist town.
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benefit of the doubt.240 Women and African-American men who kill do not win
this much warmth: The kindest response they attain laments what observers
suppose is their neglected mental illness.2 41 Angry-crazy stereotypes applied
indirectly to a white man imply that this killer, by virtue of not being a member of
an angry-crazy cohort, must have had his reasons for killing.
The inverted stereotype that regards white men as rational creatures
whose choices to engage in violence are understandable helps to generate and
strengthen social and legal consequences. Take the regulation of firearms, for
example. Whereas rights accepted in the United States are generally stated in
negative terms-freedom from encroachments rather than any freedom to have
something (such as education, housing, or a guaranteed minimum income)-the
prerogative to control a rifle powerful enough to eliminate delay in reloading while
shooting is an exception, understood as a right rather than a high-risk privilege.2 42
Opponents of what is known as gun control, rather than the more neutral-sounding
gun regulation, interpret interference with the opportunity to acquire a firearm as a
judgment from the state that putative gun-keepers cannot be trusted to manage a
dangerous instrument with care and ought to be constrained.
Contemporary gun-control measures do not exempt white people or men
from their constraints, and so do not honor the inverted stereotype that valorizes
white men as uncommonly rational. Thus they withhold a long-established and
familiar privilege. It becomes unsurprising that white men in the United States
favor gun rights and resist gun control initiatives more than their black and female
counterparts.2 43 They have more to lose.2 44 Gun control takes away a distinction
David Brooks, The Columbine Killers, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 2004, at Al7 (reporting the
refutation of these responsibility-shifting speculations). See also Sean D. Hamill, Gunman
Drew Dark Portrait of Loneliness Before Shooting Women, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 2009, at
A18 (attributing a mass shooting by a white man to rejection from Pittsburgh women).
240. For example, when the South African athlete Oscar Pistorius killed his
girlfriend, one reporter promptly gave credence to the possibility that Pistorius had mistaken
his victim for an intruder "in an apprehensive, armored country," even though the police
had scoffed at that possibility. Jer6 Longman, Pistorius Has Inspired and Divided, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 15, 2013, at B11.
241. I reviewed mainstream media sources. One exception to the racial
generalization was Jovan Belcher, an African-American football player who killed his
girlfriend and then himself; he too won some empathy. One journalist suggested that the
victim's having stayed out the night before without approval from Belcher amounted to
something like provocation. Glenn Rice, Chiefs Linebacker Jovan Belcher Kills Girlfriend,
Then Himself, KAN. CITY STAR, Dec. 1, 2012, http://www.kansascity.conv
2012/12/01/3 943246/chiefs-player-kills-girlfriend.html (noting that a quarrel "likely
continued later Saturday morning, resulting in Belcher shooting Perkins").
242. Here I refer to automatic weapons on the assumption that individuals who
have "the right to bear arms," U.S. CONST. amend. II, do not necessarily have a right to own
every possible type of armament. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Pro-Gun Voices in Congress Are
Open to Bullet Capacity Limits, N.Y. TINMs, Feb. 19, 2013, at Al (reporting willingness to
regulate high-capacity magazines among members of Congress who favor gun rights).




from white men that it cannot take from people who have already been labeled
unruly by stereotyping.
Drug policy is another state constraint that presumes black men to be
violent and unruly. The gap between recommended prison sentences for
possession of crack cocaine as compared to the powder kind has received
extensive attention in law reviews. 245 Heavier penalties for crack are commonly
attributed to the much-publicized death of African-American college basketball
246
star Len Bias in 1982. That the aptly named Bias actually overdosed on powder
cocaine supports an inference of racial prejudice behind the statutory sentencing
disparity, 247 as does the lack of any specific findings about crack when Congress
and the Sentencing Commission first acted.
The race scholar David J. Leonard has freshened this familiar critique,
noting that while drug law enforcement chases African-American offenders and
241locks them up, their white peers consume illegal drugs more. Young white users
also enjoy their own subset of drug decriminalization: Two of their favorite
substances, marijuana and unprescribed attention-deficit medication, are unlawful
de jure but condoned de facto.24 9 No stereotype of a marauding abuser interferes
with their freedom to pursue the pleasure, release, and advantages they want.
B. "Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator": Gay Means Predatory
Decades ago the trusts and estates scholar Jeffrey Sherman, reviewing
case law, speculated that "courts might be more inclined to strike down a will that
bequeaths an estate to a testator's homosexual lover than one that leaves the estate
to a testator's spouse or heterosexual lover." 250 Sherman worked with an
admittedly small data set: four published decisions, one of which upheld the will in
question. He nevertheless concluded that "the lover-legatee of a homosexual
control
-3/.
244. See generally Rachel Kalish & Michael Kimmel, Suicide by Mass Murder:
Masculinity, Aggrieved Entitlement, and Rampage School Shootings, 19 HEALTH Soc. REV.
451 (2010) (arguing that mass shooters who kill themselves believe that their final action is
justified and necessary for themselves as men).
245. The most prominent article is David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal
Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1283, 1287-91 (1995). See also Kyle Graham, Sorry Seems to
Be the Hardest Word: The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Crack, and Methamphetamine, 45
U. RICH. L. REv. 765 (2011); Sarah Hyser, Comment, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back:
How Federal Courts Took the "Fair" Out of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 117 PENN ST.
L. REv. 503, 507-13 (2012).
246. Ryan E. Brungard, Note, Finally, Crack Sentencing Reform: Why It Should
Be Retroactive, 47 TULSAL. REv. 745, 745-46 (2012).
247. Id. at 745.
248. David J. Leonard, Preventing the Rise of Pothead U., CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Jan.2, 2013, 3:29 PM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2013/01/02/preventing-the-
rise-of-pothead-u/ (citing federal government statistics).
249. Id.
250. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U.
PITT. L. REv. 225, 227 (1981).
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testator faces a more difficult task at probate than does his heterosexual
counterpart."251
Undue influence is a bold accusation-hard to prove, at least in principle,
because of a premise that it does not commonly occur. It demands a showing of
more than mere pressure. As explained in the current Restatement of Property,
those who object to a donative transfer like a will must persuade the court that "a
wrongdoer" exerted influence that "overcame the donor's free will and caused the
donor to make a donative transfer that the donor would not otherwise have
made." 252 If speaking truthfully, the unduly influenced testator would acknowledge
that the action taken in the challenged disposition was "not my wish, but I must do
it." 253 Not because all human beings lack free will, but because of extraordinary
intervention from another person. The intentional substitution of one mind for
another (assuming it happens at all) has to be rare. And yet the doctrine flourishes,
invalidating testamentary instruments. It functions to keep inheritances "within
relationships fitting preconceived social norms."
Seeking "the dominant paradigm" of undue influence doctrine, another
trusts and estates scholar, Ray Madoff, finds this quintessence in In re Will of
254 255Kaufinann,25 one of Sherman's four cases. Robert Kaufmann prepared wills and
took out life insurance favoring his lover, Walter Weiss, at the expense of his
brother and two nephews. Three courts in New York agreed the will resulted from
undue influence even though Kaufmann had written eloquently for years about his
deep affection for Weiss.
The Appellate Division appeared offended-rather than persuaded that
authentic testamentary intent must have been present-by a letter wherein
Kaufmann expressed gratitude to Weiss who, "after so many wasted, dark,
groping, fumbling immature years," had helped Kaufmann to attain "a balanced,
healthy sex life which before had been spotty, furtive and destructive" and caused
him, as Kaufmann concluded, "to be reborn and become adult!" 256 This paean,
sniffed the court, conveyed not testamentary intent but "gratitude utterly unreal,
highly exaggerated and pitched to a state of fervor and ecstasy." 257 Back in New
York's pre-Stonewall 1964, a man's open ardor for a man sounded unnatural.
From there, influence becomes undue.258
The stereotype here, I suggest, associates homosexuality with predation.
Persons of this sexual orientation-women as well as men 259 -appear dangerous:
251. Id. at 246
252. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS DON. TRANS. § 8.3 (2003).
253. Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REv. 571, 579
(1997).
254. In re Will of Kaufman, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1964).
255. Madoff, supra note 253, at 592.
256. In re Will of Kaufman, 247 N.Y.S. 2d at 671.
257. Id. at 674.
258. Madoff, supra note 253, at 592.
259. See JAYE ZIMET, STRANGE SISTERS: THEART OF LESBIAN PULP FICTION 1949-
1969 (1999).
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What they do is judged as vulpine, seductive, manipulative, or rapacious. Although
applications of this stereotype abound outside the law, we focus here on legal
consequences beyond "undue influence and the homosexual testator," the earliest
discussion of this stereotype published in the law reviews. Judges have agreed that
the predatory stereotype has resulted in detriments that warrant relief in the courts.
Scholars have gathered other under-remedied consequences, supporting them with
evidence.
A sampling: Cliff Rosky has argued that the predatory stereotype causes
judges to discriminate against gay fathers in custody disputes.260 To Dennis
Golden, the federal policy refusing to recognize same-sex couples as entitled to
immigration benefits that are available for natal family members and opposite-sex
spouses rests in part on "the 'pied piper' stereotype" of homosexual persons as
recruiting the innocent into their ranks. 261 Diane Mazur, reviewing the legislative
history behind Don't Ask, Don't Tell, enacted by Congress in 1993, concluded that
fear of predatory gay servicemen was central to the stance.262 "The gay panic
defense" has been "relatively success[ful]" in bolstering claims of insanity,
diminished capacity, provocation, and self-defense by individuals who responded
violently to homosexual advances; according to Cynthia Lee, this defense rests on11 ,263
"negative stereotypes about gay men as sexual deviants and sexual predators.
The predatory stereotype constrains heterosexually oriented women as
well as gay men. Asian-American women in the United States face a "dragon
lady" construct that attributes deceit, manipulation, and erotic power to them along
with predation.264 One of two stereotypes that undermine the credibility of rape
complaints, the seductress who invited the assault that she experienced "through
[her] provocative clothing or behavior," 265 brings us to our next example of law-
buttressed constraint.
260. See Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood,
and the Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 286-94 (2009).
261. Dennis A. Golden, The Policy Considerations Surrounding the United
States' Immigration Law as Applied to Bi-National Same-Sex Couples: Making the Case for
the Uniting Families Act, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 301, 306-07 (2009).
262. Diane H. Mazur, Re-making Decisions on the Basis of Sex: Must Gay
Women be Admitted to the Military Even if Gay Men Are Not?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 953, 989
(1997).
263. Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 471, 475-76
(2008).
264. Renee E. Tajima, Lotus Blossoms Don't Bleed: Images of Asian Women, in
MAKING WAVES: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS BY AND ABOUT ASIAN AMERICAN WOMEN
309 (Asian Women United of California eds., 1989). The television drama Ally McBeal
featured the dragon lady stereotype via a character named Ling Woo, a sexually predatory
lawyer played by Lucy Liu. Tracey Owens Patton, Ally McBeal and Her Homies: The
Reification of White Stereotypes of the Other, 32 J. BLACK STUD. 229, 250-52 (2001).
265. Juliana Breines, She Asked For It: The Impact of Rape Myths,




Women's complaints about sex-related injuries-rape and sexual
harassment in particular-encounter hostile disbelief with the help of stereotyping.
Once again the Old Testament has a stereotype tale to tell.266 Late in the book of
Genesis, the unnamed wife of one Potiphar propositioned Joseph, hero of the
chapter. When Joseph declined this offer, the spurned Mrs. Potiphar took revenge
by falsely accusing Joseph of attempting to rape her.267
An ancient and unverified anecdote, of course, but the trope of this
particular false accusation continues to occupy American law. For rape, and no
other crime, the Model Penal Code demands a prompt complaint, in effect a very
short statute of limitations.2 68 Like much of the Model Penal Code, this provision
does not appear in the law books of most states, but a few jurisdictions impose a
prompt complaint rule for marital rape.269
The crazy-female accuser stereotype emerges with particular clarity in
venerable writing about rape and juries. "No judge should ever let a sex-offence
charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental
makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician," wrote the
dean of American evidence, John Henry Wigmore.270 The Model Penal Code is
meeker, saying only that "the jury [in a rape case] shall be instructed to evaluate
the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special care," because the
witness brings "emotional involvement" to the trial, and it is hard to know "the
truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private."27
Women in sexual assault cases, according to this application of the crazy
stereotype, lie "for all sorts of reasons ... and sometimes for no reason at all."272
Michelle Anderson, seeking explanations, finds influence on the law from
Sigmund Freud and his acolytes. The path has tangles: Freud did claim that women
are masochistic, but never wrote that they purposefully lie about being raped. It
took a follower, Helene Deutsch, to propose that masochism causes women to
fantasize longingly about a violent attack.273 For Wigmore, women who accuse
266. See Frank, supra note 61 (noting exegesis on Genesis that blames Eve for the
Fall).
267. Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement,
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84
B.U. L. REV. 945, 945-46 (2004) (quoting Genesis 39:1-20).
268. Id. at 947-48.
269. Morgan Lee Woolley, Note, Marital Rape: A Unique Blend of Domestic
Violence and Non-Marital Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 269, 283-84 (2007).
The period is especially short in South Carolina, thirty days. Id. at 283.
270. 3 JOHN WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW 924a (3d ed. 1940).
271. Anderson, supra note 267, at 949 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5)).
272. COOK & CUSACK, supra note 8, at 16-17 (discussing the English case of R.
v. Henry and Manning).
273. Anderson, supra note 267, at 983 n.224 (quoting HELEN [sic] DEUTSCH, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 274 (1944)).
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men of rape are just plain sick in the head: "Their psychic complexes are
multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements
or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by temporary
physiological or emotional conditions."274
In December 1983, the Federal Bureau of Investigation asked the
Philadelphia police department why it had dismissed fifty-two percent of rape
claims-an extraordinarily high percentage-as unfounded in the first half of the
calendar year. The department replied with several variations on a theme of crazy.
Women accuse men falsely of rape, it said, for revenge and to make men feel
guilty. Girls lie about rape for reasons known only to themselves. In a semi-
rational category were lies by young women to cover up misbehaviors like
truancy, while adult women, according to the report, lie about rape to cover up
misbehaviors like adultery. The department also said that some lies stem from the
liars' eccentric belief that claiming rape entitles a victim to an abortion or the
morning-after pill free of charge. 275
Preoccupation with the dangers of false accusation, at the expense of
concern with the wrongs that accusers allege, pervades other legal responses to
sex-related harms. One study of hostile-environment sexual harassment reported a
perception that complaints harm the careers of complainants more than the
individuals they denounce.276 Stereotyping a sexual harassment accuser as either
crazy-that is, hypersensitive, delusional, overreacting-or predatorily determined
to destroy an innocent person offers a quick route to disbelieving her. The
extensive literature that deems recovered memories of sexual assault unreliable 277
might rest on good science, but it too comports with the crazy/predatory woman
stereotype. Similarly, a study of reports of sexual abuse by children and
adolescents-another setting in which the majority of accusers are female-
concludes that these claims are received with more skepticism than they
warrant.278
D. Domestic Violence Stereotypes
Domestic violence is a locus of stereotypes that, with the cooperation of
law, constrain individuals. Here are three examples subdivided with reference to
the constraints they impose.
274. Id. at 983.
275. Stephanie Hallett, Do Women Lie About Rape?, MS.BLOG (Apr. 7, 2011),
http://msmagazine.com/blog/2011/04/07/do-women-lie-about-rape/ (last visited Aug. 24,
2013).
276. Beth A. Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harassment
in the Everyday Work World, 25 LAW& Soc. INQUIRY 1151, 1177 (2000).
277. See TRUE AND FALSE RECOVERED MEMORIES: TOWARD A RECONCILIATION OF
THE DEBATE 1 (Robert F. Belli ed., 2012) (adverting to "the so-called memory wars").
278. Mark D. Everson & Barbara W. Boat, False Allegations of Sexual Abuse by
Children and Adolescents, 28 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 230, 230
(1989).
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1. Exclusion from Legal Benefits
It may sound perverse to speak of the benefits of domestic violence, but
this legal label grants extra protections to some of its victims. The federal Violence
Against Women Act funds a national hotline and interstate enforcement of
protection orders.2 79 State legislation singles out this type of violence for extra
attention by providing for "mandatory arrest, primary aggressor language in
mandatory arrest statute[s], warrantless arrest, mandatory arrest for restraining
order violation, requirement[s] that spousal abuse be considered in custody
determinations, mandatory police training, and mandatory statewide data
collection."280
Stereotyping enters this picture when state laws determine who does and
does not qualify for the benefits of warrantless arrest, civil protection orders, and
enhanced criminal penalties. These statutory schemes often exclude victims who
do not cohabit with the people who battered them (even though one subset of this
noncohabitant group, pregnant women, face a high risk of violence at the hands of
their partners), persons in same-sex relationships, and poor women who lack the
means to form bourgeois households and live instead in dwellings for transients.28
Stereotypes about domesticity welcome some victims into the privileges of legally
recognized family violence and close others out.
2. Racial Exclusion from the Battered Woman Syndrome
Another "benefit" related to domestic violence is the battered woman
syndrome, which can provide a basis for acquittal after a woman kills a person
who has been beating her. The battered woman syndrome posits a cycle of
violence and coercive control permeating a relationship such that, contrary to
standard self-defense doctrine, a woman might believe it necessary to kill even
when her batterer is unconscious.28 In addition to offering a defense at trial, this
syndrome can support post-conviction relief.283
Critics have observed that racial stereotyping lessens the value of battered
woman syndrome for African-American defendants. As the leading theorist of this
condition, Lenore Walker, has noted, black women are more likely than their white
peers to be convicted of killing their abusers. Walker speculates that a woman
claiming this syndrome must present herself as motivated by fear rather than
anger, a challenge for black people who live under the stereotype that they are
more angry than fearful.284
279. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING
188 (2000).
280. Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1841, 1854-55 (2006).
281. Id. at 1857-79.
282. See generally WALKER, supra note 232 (describing the syndrome).
283. Erin Liotta, Commentary, Double Victims: Ending the Incarceration of
California's Battered Women, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 253, 253 (2011).
284. WALKER, supra note 232, at 201-06.
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A key element of the syndrome, "learned helplessness," explains why
victims respond passively to abuse.285 Stereotyped as "domineering, assertive,
hostile, and immoral" rather than passive, African-American women may to a jury
look like the very antonym of helpless even if they were emotionally frail when
they killed.286 Claiming battered woman syndrome is extra costly and difficult for
a black defendant who may, for instance, need an additional expert "to testify as to
how the mythology concerning African-American women operates;" this burden
does not disappear when black people are among the jurors.287 One commentator
concludes that "African American women stand before the court without the same
defense readily available to white women."288
3. Constraint for Crazy Liars Redux
"Open a loophole for one woman to kill an abusive spouse and pretty
soon you've got dozens of dead husbands," an Iowa journalist wrote after the trial
of a battered woman for whom the "loophole" did not ward off a fifty-year prison
sentence.289 "You'll open the door to allow any woman to kill a man she doesn't
like, and get away with it!" cried a prosecutor when Lenore Walker proposed to
testify about battered woman syndrome.290 Criminal law scholars have joined this
chorus doubting women's veracity.291
Any justification for homicide can be abused, and self-defense lives with
the reality that dead people cannot refute what living people say about them. This
concern does not occupy writing about the defense generally: 29 2 Observers appear
confident that individuals not identified as female will use their privilege prudently
enough. Unlike battered women, these other killers are presumed not unruly. As
285. See generally Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Helplessness, 23 ANN. REV.
MED. 407 (1972) (describing laboratory findings).
286. Sharon Angella Allard, Essay, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A
Black Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 204 (1991).
287. Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery
and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995
Wis. L. REv. 1003, 1072-73 (1995).
288. Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered Woman Syndrome: Selling the Shadow to
Support the Substance, 38 How. L.J. 297, 336 (1995).
289. Leigh Goodmark, The Punishment of Dixie Shanahan: Is There Justice for
Battered Women Who Kill?, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 269, 302 (2007).
290. WALKER, supra note 232, at 33.
291. "Retaliation, as opposed to defense, is a common problem in cases arising
from wife battering and domestic violence. The injured wife waits for the first possibility of
striking against a distracted or unarmed husband." FLETCHER, supra note 232, at 21.
Allowing a battered woman to kill her sleeping abuser, writes Joshua Dressler, risks
"coarsening . . . our moral values about human life" and even condones "homicidal
vengeance." Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 457, 458 (2006).
292. Joan H. Krause, Distorted Reflections of Battered Women Who Kill: A
Response to Professor Dressler, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 555, 557 (2007).
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defense lawyer Michael Dowd has observed, however, it is men rather than women
who behave as if they enjoy a license to kill their partners for no good reason.293
Similarly, the perennial "Why didn't she leave [rather than kill her
batterer]?" implicitly accuses a battered woman of at best irrational conduct, if not
premeditated murder. It is yet another expression of the crazy-predatory
stereotype. Researchers have known for decades that attempting to leave an
abusive partner greatly increases the risk of violence at his hands,294 making the
decision to stay rational. Other good reasons for staying also exist.295 The
rhetorical question nevertheless lingers. Its effect on outcomes in court cannot be
measured, but it likely accounts for part of the high odds that a battered woman
who kills her batterer will be convicted.296
E. Brutes
In the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, the infamous reserve
clause of baseball stereotyped players as not fully human. Owners of professional
teams, immune from antitrust laws, could conspire to "buy, trade, or sell a player
as if he were a surplus box of bats." 297 Invoking the reserve clause in a routine
trade, the Cardinals in 1969 ordered outfielder Curt Flood to leave his home and
report for work in a distant city.298 Flood had started two businesses in St. Louis
and put down roots there. "After 12 years in the major leagues," he wrote to
293. When the 1970s and 80s marked a 26 percent drop in the number of men
killed by their intimate partners, researchers credited the increased availability of shelters,
pro-arrest policies, and crisis hotlines. Michael Dowd, Battered Women: A Perspective on
Injustice, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 5 (1993). During this period, women experienced no
such reduction in their rates of deadly intimate violence. Id. at 5. Dowd concludes that a
significant percentage of women, but not men, will refrain from killing their same-sex
partners if they feel they have a reasonable route out of the relationship. Id.
294. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who
Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 107 (1992).
295. Laurie S. Kohn, Why Doesn't She Leave? The Collision of First Amendment
Rights and Effective Court Remedies for Victims of Domestic Violence, 29 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1, 2 (2001) (listing six possible reasons).
296. See Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony,
and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 52 (1994)
(suggesting that because they think a rational person would have left, jurors disbelieve the
testimony of battered women). On the odds of a loss at trial, see ELIZABETH ANN DERMODY
LEONARD, CONVICTED SURVIVORS: THE IMPRISONMENT OF BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 29
(2002) (noting that 72-80 percent of women accused of killing abusive partners are
convicted or accept a plea, "and many receive long, harsh sentences").
297. David Mandell, Book Review, FLA. BAR J., Oct. 1, 2007, at 68-69
(reviewing BRAD SNYDER, A WELL-PAID SLAVE: CURT FLOOD'S FIGHT FOR FREE AGENCY IN
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS).
298. Management did not even give Flood the order directly; Flood heard the
news when a sportswriter phoned him. BRAD SNYDER, A WELL-PAID SLAVE: CURT FLOOD'S
FIGHT FOR FREE AGENCY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 1 (2006).
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baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn, "I do not feel that I am a piece of property to
be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes." 299
A journalist asked Flood how the then-large salary of $90,000 a year
could feel like "slave wages," and challenged him, "What's your retort to that?"
Curt Flood spoke the word at the center of this Article. "A well-paid slave is
nonetheless a slave." Flood's characterization of the reserve clause went over
badly, offending the public.300 He lost in the courts and died in 1997, never having
profited from what tellingly became known as free agency.30
Since then, professional athletes negotiate lucrative contracts and yet the
brute stereotype endures. Baseball rules, for example, still control what individual
players can receive: "Free agency" does not cover all participants and does not
permit the range of agreements that unfettered bargaining would yield.30 2 One
book about baseball salaries devotes a chapter to "those ballplayer characteristics
that most bother the fans-ingratitude, lack of courtesy, and disloyalty,"303 a
recitation that recalls the old race-tinged adjective "uppity." Why participants in a
labor market may not push for high returns-and to whom ballplayers have failed
to render the gratitude, courtesy, and loyalty they owe-is not answered. Union
leader Marvin Miller, ranked alongside Jackie Robinson and Babe Ruth as among
the three most important persons in baseball history, strengthened pensions and
collective bargaining in American football, basketball, and hockey as well as
baseball.304 Team owners, unwilling to forgive these victories against the
constraint of ascribed brutishness, continue to exclude Miller from their Hall of
Fame, a monument that houses countless undistinguished owners, managers, and
commissioners.305
Most notoriously at its professional level but also in the versions that
younger people play, football enforces the brute stereotype with spectacular
disregard for the brains of participants. The average tenure in the National Football
League is four years-a brief span replete with battery, head trauma, playing while
injured, and fighting to keep one's place on a team.30 A study of 3,439 retired
football players found them "three or four times more likely" than nonplayers to
299. David Margolick, Fielder's Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at BRI7.
300. Id.
301. SNYDER, supra note 298, at 346.
302. Players are not eligible for free-agent status until they have worked in the
major leagues for six years, and rules limit dealings between teams and free agents. James
Lincoln Ray, Baseball Free Agency Rules, SUITE101 (Feb. 23, 2008),
http://suite 101.com/article/baseball-free-agency-rules-a45604.
303. ROGER I. ABRAMS, THE MONEY PITCH: BASEBALL FREE AGENCY AND SALARY
ARBITRATION xviii (2000)
304. Peter Dreier & Kelly Candaele, Marvin Miller, Led Baseball Players to Free
Agency, THE JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (Dec. 4, 2012), http://forward.com/articles/
167146/marvin-miller-led-baseball-players-to-free-agency/?p=all.
305. Id.
306. GAY CULVERHOUSE, THROWAWAY PLAYERS: THE CONCUSSION CRISIS FROM
PEE WEE FOOTBALL TO THE NFL 4-7 (2012).
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die of brain diseases.3 07 Chronic traumatic encephalopathy is just one of the
game's many ravages, but it is a particularly telling one for how it holds an
athlete's mind and personality in such low regard. Without the brute stereotype
that casts the bodies of football players as "throwaway,"308 simple suggestions for
increasing safety on the field would have been investigated long ago, 309 and
players would enjoy a level of freedom and prerogative comparable to that of other
workers.310
The stereotype also flourishes in undergraduate athletics. Similar to the
notorious reserve clause that used to prevent baseball players from asserting their
interests, a National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") bylaw forbids
student athletes from working with an agent.311 They apparently must take what
their acquirers give them: they are objects, not subjects. They may not sell trinkets
like championship rings and trophies. 312 Another NCAA rule forces athletes to do
all their eating thrice daily at the table-no snacks, no carrying anything away-
even though a single basketball practice can burn 2500 calories and the famed
swimmer Michael Phelps found it impossible to maintain his weight when training
if he did not eat seven meals a day.313 Student athletes may not receive a salary for
the labors they render: what schools describe as full scholarships force many of
them to live at the poverty line, while the coffers of their athletic programs
307. Kevin Cook, Dying to Play, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 2012, at A31. See also
NFL, Players Agree to Settle Concussion Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB., AUG. 29, 2013 (reporting
$765 million settlement to redress players' brain injuries).
308. See CULVERHOUSE, supra note 306; see also Malcolm Gladwell, Offensive
Play, NEW YORKER (Oct. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/19/091019fa factgladwell?currentPage=all
(analogizing professional football to dogfighting).
309. One football blog, for example, proposes making helmets and padding much
lighter, arguing that football might achieve the safety level of rugby. See Want to Make
Football Safer? . . . Eliminate Helmets, SB NATION (Feb. 16, 2013, 11:45 AM)
http://www.hogshaven.con2013/2/16/3995210/want-to-make-football-safer-eliminate-
helmets. See also Tim Stevens, Rule Changes That Might Make Football Safer NEWs
OBSERVER (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/02/12/1848304/mle-
changes-that-might-make-football.html (listing several ideas).
310. [Flootball's labor history is the most shameful in professional
sports. The contracts still aren't real. They're not guaranteed. They are team
options and nothing more. There is no such thing as free agency. Star players
rarely get to choose the team that they play for; teams can 'franchise' them
and use other measures to prevent players from ever becoming free agents.
E-mail from Brad Snyder, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law
School, to Anita Bernstein, Jul. 28, 2013 (on file with Author).
311. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Assoc. BYLAW 12.3 (1996).
312. Luke McConnell, NCAA Places Unfair Restrictions on Student Athletes, THE
OKLAHoMA DAILY (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.oudaily.com/news/2011/aug/23/coluinn-
ncaa-places-unfair-restrictions-student-ath/.
313. Hungry Athletes: NCAA Rules Limit Players' Food Intake, SPORTINGNEWS




overflow.314 Resistance in court, according to a newspaper columnist, is futile:
"Athletes almost never win lawsuits against the N.C.A.A."315
How much brutality can accompany the brute stereotype is a question
explored by the historian Claire Potter on the death of the celebrated University of
Texas football coach Darrell Royal. According to the record Potter reviews, in the
1960s Royal would get rid of unwanted players by forcing them to pummel one
another in protracted drills until they either quit in severe pain, forfeiting their
scholarships, or could no longer play.316 One of his players, who had published a
book exposing Royal's practices, died schizophrenic on the streets of Dallas.3 17
Darrell Royal's objection to racial integration points up a connection
between the stereotyping of athletes and of African-American nonathletes as
well:318 The brute stereotype has been applied to both groups. One of the earliest
attempts to gain judicial condennation of stereotyping away from Title VII,
United States v. Hendry County School District,3 1 9 featured an argument by
plaintiffs that the defendant school district had rearranged its programs so as to
cluster "what blacks do best"-vocational training, special education and pre-
school acculturation classes-at a historically all-black grade school 320 All three
programs lie outside mainstream education; they regard the student as a young
brute who needs constraint to become a docile, tractable, and moderately
productive low-level worker. Siding with the school district,3 2 1 the court may have
sided with stereotyping.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF STEREOTYPING
Two amendments to the U.S. Constitution speak to the problem of
stereotyping, although they probably do not prohibit it. When stereotyping
constrains, it lessens human freedom and thus falls within the ambit of what the
314. RAMOGI HUMvA & ELLEN STAUROWSKY, NATIONAL COLLEGE PLAYERS Ass'N.,
THE PRICE OF POVERTY IN BIG TIME COLLEGE SPORT 4 (2011); see also Dave D'Alessandro,
Lawsuit Filed by Former Nets Forward Ed O'Bannon Threatens NCAA's Economic Model,
NEWARK STAR-LEDGER (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.nj.comledger-dalessandro/
index.ssf/2013/03/lawsuit filed_by former nets forward ed obarnon threatens ncaas ec
onomic modelhtml (noting that a former NCAA executive director wrote that the NCAA
has "a plantation mentality").
315. Joe Nocera, Academic Counseling Racket, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 2013, at A23.
An antitrust class action brought against the NCAA by student athletes was faring well,
however, when this Article went to press. See The College Athletics Business: Basket Cases,
ECONOMIST, Jul. 27, 2013, at 75 (reporting a successful motion to expand a putative class to
include current athletes).
316. Claire Potter, The Tributes to Darrell Royal Avoid an Uglier History,
TENURED RADICAL (Nov. 11, 2012, 10:23 AM), http://chronicle.com/blognetwork
/tenuredradical/2012/11/4104/.
317. Id.
318. Id. (stating that Royal used racial epithets against opposing teams and kept a
black letterman off the Longhorns until 1970).
319. 504 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1974).
320. Id. at 553-54.
321. Id.
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Thirteenth Amendment set out to repair. Another mandate for change comes from
the role of state action in the harms catalogued in the last Part. Arguments from the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments must be applied to stereotyping with care,
of course. This Part considers them not as imperatives for judges to apply, but as
constitutional supports for rectification work ahead.
A. The Constraint of Stereotyping in Modern Thirteenth Amendment
Perspective
Like their precursors in ancient Athens, slaveholders in the United States
once craved the comfort of Aristotle's "by nature formed" to explain and justify
their status as masters. Because they needed to know why slaves were slaves, "the
image of the thrall as nasty, ugly, foul, stupid, cowardly, and inferior" duly
arose.32 Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century rationales for slavery included other
elements (notably references to Scripture), but at their core was the inferiority of
persons enslaved. Proslavery thought of the era flourished particularly in the
South. It also took root away from this region.32
One infamous rationale, articulated by U.S. Senator James Henry
Hammond in 1858, found a metaphor for slavery in architecture. A mudsill rests at
the low level of a foundation, holding up a building. For Hammond, slavery was
the mudsill. Though inferior to white persons, he explained, the slave race of the
South was nevertheless "eminently qualified in temper, in vigor, in docility, in
capacity to stand the climate" to do the work of holding up civilization.32 Nature
helped: Slaves were too "happy, content, unaspiring, and utterly incapable, from
intellectual weakness, ever to give us any trouble by their aspirations."325 Of
course, American slave masters did not put full trust in this "unaspiring" state.
They installed shackles, both literal and legal, to tighten their constraint on their
slaves, and they waged an extraordinarily bloody war trying to preserve the
institution.
Something more urgent than a threat to property must have been at stake
for the Confederate side in the Civil War. Most of its warriors who volunteered for
the cause came from families that did not own slaves.32 6 They signed up for a high
risk of dying: Hundreds of thousands of Confederate soldiers did not return alive.
Holders of mere chattel walk away from what they possess when the price of
defending it grows this high. The Civil War revealed a desire to maintain
constraint of the unruly at an extraordinarily high price. The persistence of
322. ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
249 (1982).
323. See PAUL FINKELMAN, DEFENDING SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE
OLD SOUTH (2003); DREW GILPIN FAUST, THE IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY
THOUGHT IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH, 1830-1860 (1981).
324. SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS AND SPEECHES OF THE HON. JAMES H.
HAMMOND, OF SOUTH CAROLINA 318 (John F. Trow & Co., 1866).
325. Id. at 320.




unruliness as a theme in contemporary stereotyping suggests that this desire
remains in place.
Just as the Civil War must have been about more than property, the
Thirteenth Amendment, made part of the United States Constitution soon after the
war, must have been about more than invalidating a single legal category of
ownership. If invalidation were all this amendment did, then its first section-an
assertion that slavery and involuntary servitude no longer exist in the United
States-would have sufficed. Yet a second section went on to grant enforcement
power to Congress. Enforcement power implies ongoing work to do, and the
inclusion of a second section implies that "domination and enforced social
dependency"-what this Article has called constraint-"do not disappear in
modem societies," even long after these societies codify formal emancipation.327
Making reference to Section two, the Supreme Court in 1968 brought a
famed Reconstruction-era phrase into the modem era when it described resistances
that strive to stave off what the Thirteenth Amendment provides. Some persons
who could no longer buy and sell slaves, supported by a legal and political culture
ambivalent about full abolition, hoped to enjoy de facto what they had lost de jure.
From this social setting emerged what the Court called the "badges and incidents
of slavery."3 28 Lawmaking powers of Congress, wrote Justice Stewart more than a
hundred years after enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, include the authority
to prohibit private actions that amount to such badges and incidents.
The phrase may be indeterminate-"badges" is a metaphor of uncertain
meaning and "incidents," implying something related to an antecedent, here
slavery, asserts the connection it seeks to find-but the "incidents" half of it
constitutionalizes a class of post-abolition ills. From here, it becomes plausible to
put stereotyping in that class. When the United States ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment, the two groups that today suffer the most comprehensively from
stereotyping lived under a jackboot of extraordinary, status-based constraint that
the law enforced and abetted. Stereotyping that identifies groups of persons as
uncontrolled, destabilizing, and dangerous imposes badges and incidents of an
oppression that was once written into doctrine and that current law ought to
repudiate.
That contemporary stereotyping constrains groups of persons other than
African Americans (and women, if coverture is perceived as comparable to chattel
slavery) does not preclude reading the Thirteenth Amendment to cover the breadth
of its mischief. Antebellum slavery in the United States trammeled on more than
enslaved persons themselves. Freed slaves, white abolitionists, and even members
of the House of Representatives suffered legal constraint. These interferences, as
Chip Carter observes, had to happen: Slavery as an institution "depended not only
upon the coercive power to deny freedom and equality to blacks but also . . . upon
327. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 40, at 1475.
328. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968).
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the expressive power of law and custom to deny the validity of the idea of black
freedom and equality."329
At the founding of the Constitution, write Jack Balkin and Sanford
Levinson, the word slavery meant not a form of property but "the opposite of
republican government. American revolutionaries argued that British tyranny and
the unrepresentativeness of British institutions had reduced them to slaves."330 To
Balkin and Levinson, crabbed readings of the Thirteenth Amendment that both
Congress and the courts have imposed since The Civil Rights Cases are predictable
and make sense. The alternative-reading the text broadly enough to stand against
unjust subordination-threatens hierarchies and the power holders who enjoy
them. Especially because the Thirteenth Amendment demands no state action and
thus enables Congress to confront private actors, it appears unbounded.
What next? Analyzing what he calls "Thirteenth Amendment
optimism"-the serious contention that this text "prohibits in its own terms, or
should be read by Congress to permit, practices that one opposes but that do not in
any obvious way constitute either chattel slavery or involuntary servitude as these
terms are ordinarily understood"-Jamal Greene reviews academic arguments that
have found novel constitutional rights in the Thirteenth Amendment. Greene
praises these works guardedly, noting that they did not persuade judges. He deems
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the 1968 reviver of "badges and incidents of
slavery," an arguable "mistake" and a precedent that has had "virtually no
significant doctrinal progeny."331 Thirteenth Amendment vitality can best emerge,
Greene concludes, not so much from courts as from Congress using its Section two
power to "root out pervasive and demeaning inequality and subjugation."332
Implications follow for the rectification of what's wrong with
stereotyping. Section two of the Thirteenth Amendment gives options to Congress;
it does not compel enabling legislation. In the chief Thirteenth Amendment
success story that Greene retells, Congress, persuaded by advocates who called
their stance "constitutionally inspired," expanded labor rights in the early years of
the twentieth century. Yet one Thirteenth Amendment victory that Greene
mentions, successful efforts by the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division to
combat peonage through aggressive litigation during the 1940s, scarcely engaged
Congress at all. Southern congressmen rebuffed the section chief when he lobbied
for change in federal involuntary servitude statutes. What succeeded, according to
Risa Goluboff, was a "feedback loop [that] developed between federal
enforcement and rights consciousness."333 Awareness of Civil Rights Division
litigation success generated support from the public, from there the relaying of
329. William M. Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment and Pro-Equality Speech,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1855, 1859 (2012).
330. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 40, at 1470.
331. Greene, supra note 39, at 1762.
332. Id at 1763.
333. Id. at 1753 (citing Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost
Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DuKE L.J. 1609, 1646 (2001)).
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winnable complaints to the Department of Justice, and from there more public
support.
The peonage precedent and its feedback loop allows stereotyping and the
Thirteenth Amendment to meet and engage the other sources of change that
Greene identifies. Consistent with Greene's prioritization of Section two,
reformers can propose statutory change to remedy the harms of stereotyping. I will
do so presently. Objections to stereotyping have made (limited) gains in court: The
litigation strategy can generate feedback-loop enhancement resembling what
Goluboff found in peonage cases. Greene's skepticism about Thirteenth
Amendment optimism, and Section one in particular, is well taken.334 Courts will
not rule that stereotyping violates the constitutional prohibition of slavery. They
can, however, join with other institutional actors in the larger project of
ameliorating its ills.
B. Stereotyping Near the Border of State Action
The Thirteenth Amendment, as was noted, contains no requirement of
state action. Yet the issue of governmental responsibility deserves attention in any
recommendation that governmental actors change what they are doing. The state
action doctrine derives from the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
prohibits state governments from abridging the privileges and immunities of
citizens; depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without due process; and
denying persons equal protection of the laws. Here I broach the geographic
metaphor of a border and site this wrong near the border of state action. Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, a famous civil-rights era decision, explored
possibilities on point.335
Managers of the Heart of Atlanta Motel, wishing to continue excluding
African-American guests from the premises, objected to the newly enacted Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as a barrier to its policy. The Supreme Court upheld the statute
as constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Justice Douglas wrote a concurrence
that focused on how the motel counted on support from the state of Georgia.33 6
Codified statutory law, he said, recognized Heart of Atlanta's property interest in
its motel and enabled it to call the police when it deemed a visitor a trespasser. To
Douglas, the governmental role looked enough like that in Shelley v. Kraemer, the
Court's boldest state action decision, which had invalidated under the Fourteenth
Amendment a racial covenant between private parties. 337 The contract generated
state action, said the Court in Shelley, because the state adds imprimatur and
334. The litigation experience of baseball player Curt Flood, who had referred to
himself as "a well-paid slave," see supra notes 298-97 and accompanying text, supports this
skepticism. See SNYDER, supra note 298, at 207 (noting that although Flood's complaint had
claimed that the reserve clause of major league baseball violated federal statutes against
peonage and slavery, his lawyers demoted this contention to a footnote when Flood's
challenge moved to the appellate level).
335. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
336. Id. at 283-84.
337. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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enforcement to race discrimination whenever it upholds a discriminatory
agreement.338
Jurors who disbelieve a female complainant because they think she is
crazy, legislators who vote to prohibit LGBT persons from enlisting in the armed
forces because they deem this cohort predatory, administrators who write rules that
limit the options and prerogatives of college athletes in the belief that these
athletes are brutes, judges who interpret self-defense generously for Caucasian
male killers and stingily for African-American and female killers, and other actors
who make decisions under color of law may look different from the Atlanta police
referenced by Justice Douglas, who would remove or arrest African-American
visitors at the racist behest of a land possessor, or the Missouri courts that might if
permitted have enforced the covenant in Shelley v. Kraemer. The prejudice in these
older cases is more blatant, the hand of the state easier to discern. By describing
the legal consequences of stereotyping as near the border of state action-they are
not state action itself-I draw on literature.
Scholars have identified instances of race and sex discrimination that the
law does not prohibit and can be carried on with impunity. In separate law review
articles, Richard Banks and Solangel Maldonado have sought to interfere with the
preference against African-American infants that white adoptive parents
manifest.339 Professor Banks proposed to proscribe what he called "facilitative
accommodation," where an adoption agency (either a private one that receives
government funding or a unit of state government, working with child welfare
departments) classifies children by race and accedes to adoptive parents' desires
for a child of that classification.340 Federal legislation prohibits "race matching,"
insisting thereby that agencies make their placements on a colorblind basis rather
than prefer black parents for black children, but does nothing to impose
colorblindness on adoptive parents. Banks wonders about under-perceived state
action: "[R]ules of prohibition are understood as involving the state, but rules of
permission are not."31
Aware of this preconception about state action, Banks invited the state to
draft a rule of permission: "Adoption agencies that receive any government
funding should not accommodate adoptive parents' racial preferences." 342 Eight
years later Professor Maldonado identified another racial preference of adoptive
parents: Asian and Latin American children, obtainable by international adoption,
over African-American children-many of them the "healthy infants" favored in
this realm-who take longer to gain homes.343 Maldonado proposed that Congress
338. Id. at 19-20.
339. R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial
Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998); Solangel
Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1415
(2006).
340. Banks, supra note 339, at 880.
341. Id. at 919.
342. Id. at 943.
343. Maldonado, supra note 339, at 1415.
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compel adoptive parents who want to adopt internationally to wait a year, unless
they can show that they tried to adopt a U.S.-born child without regard to race but
were unsuccessful. 344
What is the connection, one might query, between stereotyping as a legal
category and the bias by adoptive parents against African-American children that
Banks and Maldonado identify and try to ameliorate? They share characteristics
found at the border of state action. At this border, the state lends ambiguous,
contestable support to discriminatory conduct by non-state actors who may have
not considered the possibility that what they are doing discriminates against any
group. Human beings are suffering and might have a claim for legal relief, but
their route to recovery is not apparent.
Another characteristic found at the border of state action is how difficult
it is to install a remedy for the problem. Maldonado and Banks have proposed
federal legislation that Congress will almost certainly never enact. Another border-
of-state-action scholarly work also illustrates the remedial difficulty: Martha
Chamallas argues that the use of race- and sex-based statistical data to estimate a
plaintiff's lost future earnings, long condoned by judges in tort litigation, is
unconstitutional.345
Advocating race- and gender-neutral actuarial data in court, Chamallas
revisits familiar themes. State action is obscured by custom, Chamallas observes:
"the lives of women and racial minorities are devalued" by a mechanism that
falsely appears neutral.346 Unlike the proposals of Banks and Maldonado, this
suggestion has been given legal effect; 347 but whereas Banks and Maldonado spell
out exactly what they want to happen, Chamallas titles her article "Questioning the
Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation" and,
true to her word, she questions; she does not prescribe much. Rules of evidence (or
perhaps procedure) could be rewritten to keep out gender- and race-specific data,
but Chamallas does not take that path. She focuses instead on the education of
litigants and judges-another overlap with the goals of this Article, explored in the
next and final Part.
344. Id. at 1472-73.
345. Chamallas, supra note 23, at 106. Race- and gender-specific earnings data
admitted at tort trials differs from stereotyping in a crucial respect: it is state action, as
Chamallas argues persuasively, whereas stereotyping lies outside this border. "If such a
standard were explicitly embodied in a statute (e.g., 'In determining the future earning
capacity of a plaintiff who has no established record of earnings, damages may be based on
projections that take into account the plaintiff's race and gender')," Chamallas notes, "the
legislation would clearly constitute state action. The outcome should not be different simply
because the governing legal standard is a common law or nonstatutory standard."
346. Id.
347. McMillan v. City of N.Y., 253 F.R.D. 247, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); United
States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1315 (D. Utah 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 410
F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005).
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VI. REPAIRING THE WRONG
Understood as constraint that the law remedies but also buttresses, 348
stereotyping invites reformers to consider reparative measures. This next section
surveys the record. It starts by examining changes to the law that ameliorated the
harms of stereotyping, and then identifies cohorts and institutional actors who,
going forward, can make particular types of contributions.
A. Rectification Precedents
Notable law reforms have taken on stereotyping in efforts to lessen its
constraints. Although advocates of these measures typically do not use the term
stereotyping to describe what they resist or seek to prohibit, stereotyping is central
to the wrong they address. So, for example, when the Seventh Circuit in 1971
declared that, in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes,"349 many members of Congress who had assembled to vote
on this bill were alive and could testify about what they intended. Presumably they
would have found this reference to stereotyping unfamiliar. And yet the assertion
is plausible: The Supreme Court cited it with approval and, as we have seen, the
condemnation of discrimination does indeed entail the condemnation of some
stereotyping.
In this perspective, codified civil rights-which the noted lexicographer
William Safire defined as "positive legal prerogatives" that include "the right to
equal treatment before the law, the right to vote, the right to share equally with
other citizens in such benefits as jobs, housing, education, and public
accommodations"-HcSsarily take a stand against stereotyping, even if they
eschew this word in their text and legislative history and even while they do other
work. A stereotype that constrains some group of persons while leaving other
groups unconstrained functions to deprive individuals of equal treatment; the
"positive legal prerogatives" of civil rights legislation provide redress for unjust
constraint.
Federal legislation takes a stand against stereotyping in the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The third prong of this statute extends ADA
protection to individuals who are not in fact disabled, but appear that way.351
Congress included this regarded-as-disabled classification to combat "myths, fears
and stereotypes associated with disabilities." 352 As the Sixth Circuit once noted,
this recognition is not found in other civil rights legislation like Title VII or the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.35 3 Widening the class of protected
348. See supra Part I.
349. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
350. Bernstein, Civil Rights Violations, supra note 214, at 898-99 (quoting
WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE'S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 127 (5th ed. 2008)).
351. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (2012).
352. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111) at 30 (1990).
353. Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2001).
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persons in a civil rights statute to include nonmembers makes no sense unless a
stereotype exists pernicious of itself, doing harm to people who do not share the
condition at issue. The ADA shows that Congress judged stereotyping of the
disabled important enough to fall in that category.
For another enactment that resists what is wrong with stereotyping,
consider rape shield laws, which deem evidence about the past sexual behavior of
an alleged victim inadmissible at trial. Now codified in the statutory law of almost
every U.S. state,354 as well as the Federal Rules of Evidence355 and the Military
Rules of Evidence,356 these provisions originated in feminist law reform.35 7
Questions about rape shield provisions as policy-how well they work, how much
judicial discretion they ought to allow at trial, which exceptions to inadmissibility
ought to be recognized-fill a rich literature: I note them here only for what they
say about stereotyping.
As the Advisory Committee Notes observed in 1994, federal rape shield
laws limit the deployment of stereotyping during cross-examination.358 The
stereotypes that a cross-examining lawyer invokes cast female complainants as
untrustworthy, addled, probably vengeful, and befouled by having had sex. As an
instance of legal resistance to what is wrong with stereotyping, rape shield laws
resist constraints that burden women. Before this reform, writes Michelle
Anderson, "[w]omen heard the rules: If you want the criminal law to vindicate you
if you are raped, you better have led an unsullied sexual life."35 9
The stereotype that women are crazy has suffered a happy setback in the
judicial acceptance of battered woman syndrome, which interprets violent or anti-
social behaviors as an understandable response to extraordinary conditions. Lenore
Walker, who as an expert witness helped persuade numerous American judges that
this syndrome ought to be conveyed to juries in homicide prosecutions, has written
that in the early years of her efforts, prosecutors misunderstood battered woman
syndrome as a variation on insanity offered as an excuse.36 Courts and legislatures
continue to disagree on whether battered woman syndrome is an excuse, which is
consistent with the stereotype about craziness, or instead a condition that supports
361
self-defense, a justification that rejects the stereotype.
354. Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License:
Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 51, 81 n.150 (2002)
("Only Arizona has not passed a rape shield law of any kind.").
355. FED. R. EVID. 412.
356. MIL. R. EVID. 412.
357. Anderson, supra note 354, at 80 (citing Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape
Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L.
REv. 763, 764-66 (1986)).
358. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory comnittee's note.
359. Anderson, supra note 354, at 54.
360. WALKER, supra note 232, at 45, 303.
361. See Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence,
Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers. 106 HARv. L. REV. 1574, 1586 (1993) (discussing
battered woman syndrome in terms of self-defense).
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As with rape shield laws, observers need not take a position on a
controversy to note the erosion of a stereotype. Even when courts accept battered
woman syndrome as only an excuse and thereby deem an individual mentally
disturbed-rather than honor her for doing something praiseworthy by defending
herself362-they acknowledge that a battered woman does not bear sole
responsibility for the violent act she committed. She had an abuser, a source of
unjust mistreatment that left her desperate. If when she acted she was out of her
mind, in the vernacular, she was driven there by the malevolent acts of another.
This victim was not always broken: The expert testimony required to establish
battered woman syndrome, whether as excuse or justification, implies that the
default for a woman is to be not-crazy. Courts and commentators who question
battered woman syndrome as a defense emphasize the status of women as rational
creatures.36 Every respectable stance on this question, in short, advances the
erosion of a pernicious stereotype.
A final illustration of law reform achievements against stereotyping is the
rise of same-sex marriage, or what increasing numbers of observers tellingly call
marriage equality. We have seen that references to equality as a legal concept
frequently implicate stereotyping, whose chief characteristic in the law is the
unjust constraint of some groups and not others.364 Whether "marriage equality" is
an accurate synonym for, or perhaps an improvement on, "same-sex marriage"
need not be resolved here. For present purposes, this discursive shift relates to the
stereotyping inherent in the opposite-sex criterion for entry into marriage.
Treating women the same as men and husbands the same as wives for
purposes of regulating entry into this legal status takes a stand against gender
stereotyping in that only ascribed generalizations, rather than anything biological
or physical, can explain why a woman may not marry a woman and a man may not
marry a man.365 The marital conjunction of a vagina and a penis concerns the law
only when one member of a couple makes an issue of it in court: Sexual
intercourse is an option for couples who marry rather than a requirement, and it
does not consummate a legal status.366 Procreation cannot explain the opposite-sex
demand either,36 7 because a man and a woman may form a lawful marriage even
when they intend to generate no children, are unable to generate children without
assistance, or will share no activities related to parenthood. Gender dimorphism as
a criterion for entry into marriage fits a description of stereotyping's effects that
362. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
363. See DONALD ALEXANDER DowNs, MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN,
THE SYNDROME SOCIETY, AND THE LAW (1996); David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The
Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 67 (1997).
364. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
365. Limiting the number of persons in a marriage to two, by contrast, can be
justified without constraining generalizations. See Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating
Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1955, 1975-76 (2010) (reviewing the arguments).
366. Anita Bernstein, Toward More Parsimony and Transparency in "The
Essentials of Marriage," 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 106-07.
367. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg offered decades ago: The demand puts "all males in one
pigeonhole, all females in another, based on assumed or documented notions about
'the way women or men are."'6 Abandoning this criterion helps to lessen the
effects of an under-justified constraint.
B. Going Forward
Three categories of law reformers have roles to play in repairing the legal
wrong of stereotyping. All have already done some of this work.
1. For Litigators and Litigants: Protect, Enlarge, Refute
Both plaintiffs and defendants can foster the development of stereotyping
as a legal wrong by telling courts about the constraints they experience.
Employment discrimination case law has started this work, but both sides of the
caption have more to say. Defendants have, so far, appeared oddly helpless in
response to accusations of stereotyping. Their most winning posture seems to be
denial. Once stereotyping as a legal wrong is understood as constraint, however,
another avenue opens for them: They can concede stereotyping arguendo, but deny
that it constrained. This stance would serve them particularly well at summary
judgment.
As for employment discrimination plaintiffs, they have only begun to tell
what stereotyping does to them. Clarifying the relation between stereotyping and
constraint would expand case law by inviting more description; publishing these
accounts would help to reduce the injustice of constraint by expanding on a
familiar yet ill-understood wrong.
Now that transgender discrimination has been recognized as a type of
unlawful stereotyping, the unfinished business for stereotyping in employment law
concerns dress and grooming rules.369 When the Ninth Circuit held in Jespersen v.
Harrah's Operating Co. that a casino could force its female employees to wear
face powder, blush, mascara, and "lip color ... at all times,"3 70 it upheld a policy
that forced women, and not men, to show up for work with their faces adorned and
mediated. Lip color and mascara are products that a wearer feels on her skin. They
have texture and weight. They consume time: Lip color demands continual
reapplication to be on "at all times," and mascara does not come off easily without
liquids engineered and purchased for the task. Darlene Jespersen said at her
deposition that the makeup rule her employer, Harrah's, installed after she had
been bartending for many years interfered with her ability to do her job.371 Despite
this reference to constraint, the court rejected her claim of stereotyping, concluding
368. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting difficulties with this
definition).
369. My thanks to Peggie Smith for an illuminating discussion of this issue.
370. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.
2006).
371. Id. at 1108.
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that Harrah's makeup rule did not force wearers to appear sexually provocative
and thus did not "stereotype women as sex objects." 372
A successor litigant could enlarge the number and nature of stereotypes at
issue, relating their constraint to sex discrimination. This litigant could contend
that by banning makeup for men and mandating it for women,373 Harrah's enforced
a familiar conceit that one of two genders faces the world unadorned and
ingenuous while the other puts on a face. 374 The makeup rule comports with the
stereotype of women as lying, predatory seducers. 3 75 Time and money that makeup
demands add up to another constraint.
Employment discrimination plaintiffs tend to lose dress-and-grooming
cases;376 the litigation stance I endorse might not reverse this pattern for them. It
would, however, advance the state of knowledge about gender stereotyping in the
workplace. It also expands understanding of the coercion that accompanies
employment at will.3 77
Litigants-again, both defendants and plaintiffs-can also enlarge the
catalogue of unlawful stereotyping by extending the subject beyond employment.
The success of a transgender-stereotyping claim brought under the Equal
Protection Clause can help to lift actionable stereotyping past Title VII.378 Even
though constitutional claims exclude private-sector defendants, this path to court
would help to publicize the legal wrong. Regarded-as-disabled litigants can also
shed light on pernicious stereotyping by bringing ADA claims. As with Title VII,
defendants enhance understanding of stereotyping by showing, when they can, that
plaintiffs experienced no constraint. They can also demonstrate the constraint on
them of making stereotyping actionable.
372. Id. at 1112.
373. Id. at 1107.
374. The Italian verb for "to put on makeup" is truccarsi, literally "to make a
(dissembling) trick of oneself." The same reflexive verb is used for "to disguise."
375. See supra Part IV.C.
376. Yuracko, supra note 167.
377. One study of the Jespersen litigation explores how managerial decisions to
homogenize the appearance of workers to tighten their corporate "brand" generate coercion
of employees. Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual
Stereotyping, and the New Face of Capitalism, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 13, 49
(2007) (describing one of the decisions in this case as "the essence of employment at will:
The employee must take it (the job on the employer's terms) or leave it."); id. at 73
(associating "branding" as policy at Harrah's with the 1998 arrival of a new CEO who
insisted on a homogenous workplace). On the coercion of Darlene Jespersen, see id. at 46
(noting that at her deposition Jespersen described her short-lived attempt to tend bar while
wearing makeup as destructive to her "credibility as an individual and as a person").
Jespersen felt so strongly about makeup (and, apparently, was a valuable enough employee)
that Harrah's granted her informal dispensation from the rule for many years, firing her only
after an image consultant recommended strict enforcement in 2000. Id. at 46-47.
378. See Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2007).
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2. For Judges: Describe
Judges have been writing the decisional law of stereotyping for decades.
They work with what litigants give them-most noteworthily, perhaps, in 1985
when Gerhard Gesell decided to let the social psychologist Susan T. Fiske talk in
court about how stereotyping hanned Ann Hopkins.379 Courts should expect
plaintiffs to furnish this basic point of information. When stereotyping is their
cause of action, as is the case for some employment discrimination claims,380
persons who do not bother to describe the stereotype that they believe hurt them
deserve a swift Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
What judges add to plaintiffs' narratives is their assessment of whether an
unlawful stereotype was present and caused actionable injury. When they answer
that question in the affirmative, judges ought to identify the stereotype they deem
present, rather than use stereotyping as shorthand for Plaintiff Wins. This
descriptive effort would clarify the distinction between stereotyping and prejudice
or discrimination. Recurring negative generalizations that harm individuals-both
the kind that courts rule unlawful and the kind they tend to condone-would build
in decisional law, and plaintiffs and defendants would gain a better understanding
of where they stand before they dispute a claim of stereotyping before a judge.381
3. For Legislatures: Codify, Clarify
State legislatures and Congress hold powers to ameliorate the harms of
stereotypes that the law now buttresses. They might well wish to do so. Although
expansive new civil rights legislation has not filled state or federal codes in the
United States for a couple of decades, statutory protections continue to emerge and
gain ground. Recognition of sexual orientation and transgender status as civil
rights categories has been especially vital of late, and the idea that stereotyping
wrongfully inflicts injury that ought to be remedied appears to enjoy support. That
litigants and litigators choose to frame their complaints as being about stereotyping
suggests that voters would approve writing the word into more legislation.
The Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to deter and punish
invidious discrimination that relegates individuals into what Alexander Tsesis,
writing about women as well as African-American men, has called "a state of
unfreedom."382 As exemplified by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, this remedial
power can reach every setting where oppression might thrive, including cartels,
379. See generally Chamallas, supra note 182, at 90-91 (reviewing the
controversial nature of this ruling).
380. Cases where courts have accepted sex stereotyping as a cause of action
include McBride v. Peak Wellness Center, Inc., 688 F.3d 698, 711 (10th Cir. 2012); Gilbert
v. Country Music Ass'n, 432 Fed. Appx. 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Salem,
378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004); Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d
135, 151 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2007).
381. A West headnote category called Stereotypes already exists, under Labor and
Employment Law > Discrimination. It could be expanded.
382. Alexander Tsesis, Gender Discrimination and the Thirteenth Amendment,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1653 (2012).
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individuals acting alone or in groups, businesses too small for the Commerce
Clause or other civil rights statutes, and state governments.383 Few constitutional
limits obstruct reparative efforts against stereotyping brought under the Thirteenth
Amendment.
In addition to writing new prohibitions of harms that emerge from
stereotyping, Congress could clarify that "sex stereotyping" is indeed a cause of
action under the federal civil rights laws, as several courts have said.384 This
clarification could readily include racial stereotyping. Such new legislation would
resemble the Civil Rights Act of 1991, codified in response to decisional law and
focused more on procedure and remedies than expanded classifications. Whereas
the 1991 act originated in strife between the legislature and the judiciary,
however,385 future laws about stereotyping from Congress would advance and
harmonize progressive work that courts pioneered.
CONCLUSION
Unaware of what Justice William Brennan had in store for it, the
defendant of the great American stereotyping decision put "sex stereotyping" in
quotation marks throughout its Supreme Court brief, as if the phrase were a bit of a
joke. 38 6 Not too funny, but not serious either; nothing with "legal relevance. "387
For Price Waterhouse as it defended a sex discrimination claim, stereotyping must
have evoked something trivial like dumb jocks, amorous Frenchmen, humorless
Germans, and other risible creatures who fill "the pictures in our heads." 388
Sex stereotyping for the adversary of Price Waterhouse, by contrast, had
imposed shackles. It left Ann Hopkins little room to earn the record she needed to
gain promotion: She was squeezed between, on one side, the "chann school" 389
matriculant, easy enough on male colleagues' eyes and ears but looking like just
the opposite of Big Accounting partnership material and, on the other, the
threatening, "macho," 390 gender-defiant office warrior who made her bosses
uneasy. Stereotyping curbed Ann Hopkins' movements, consumed her time,
limited what she could say, reduced her opportunities to get credit for what she
achieved, and locked her out of the Price Waterhouse partnership.
"Title VII lifts women out of this bind," wrote Justice Brennan. 39 1 So it
did for Hopkins, who after her victory joined the defendant firm as a partner.
383. Id. at 1653-54.
384. See supra note 167.
385. Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1095, 1097-98 (1993).
386. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
387. Id.
388. LIPPMvANN, supra note 10.
389. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-35.
390. Id. at 235.
391. Id. at 251.




Title VII imposes responsibility for harmful conduct: Luckily for Hopkins, the
wrong she suffered had a remedy. More of what's wrong with stereotyping can be
righted by the law.
The law of stereotyping, still young, has experienced only its earliest
achievements. Price Waterhouse shows the strength of the concept. Cited in well
over four thousand judicial opinions-more than Roe v. Wade, which had a
sixteen-year head start, and more than any other decision of the 1988 Tenn, a year
that included noteworthy output from the Court39 3-this precedent has won fame
less for its holding, which described the burden of proof in mixed-motives cases (a
judgment that Congress undid a couple of years later),3 94 than for its bold
declaration that stereotyping is a legal wrong. Most of the Justices declined to sign
that declaration. It may have been dicta.3 95 Yet when employees picked up the idea
and ran with it, they won successes that grow ever larger. Calling what happened
at work "stereotyping" now offers plaintiffs an especially good route to victory in
court,3 96 and case law on stereotyping has helped build the only federal civil rights
available to date for employees who do not hew to a gender binary.
Employment discrimination litigants, litigators, and courts have taken on
a reparative task that no other area of law has reckoned with, even though the
violation that Ann Hopkins presented so carefully at her trial has manifestations
throughout American society. I have argued in this Article that the wrong of
stereotyping is constraint. This constraint does not live only in the workplace, and
it dates back before ancient Greece.3 97
It also has constitutional dimensions.398 This Article paid particular heed
to two crucial amendments,3 99 but stereotyping implicates the original text of the
U.S. Constitution as well. Hierarchies and oppressions entrenched by stereotyping
offend republicanism as promised by the Guarantee Clause.400 Law-supported
marginalization of individuals based on their membership in subordinated groups
undermines representative democracy, a concern that has constitutionalized state
actions like obstructions of the right to vote.401 When it impedes political
393. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Sers., 489
U.S. 189 (1989).
394. See supra note 186.
395. See supra Part II.B.
396. Vodjik, supra note 128.
397. See supra Part I.A.
398 I thank Brad Snyder for the thoughts he shared that inform this paragraph.
399 See supra Part V.
400 "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican
form of government." U.S. CONST., art. IV, sec. 4. Republicanism as propounded by a
leading eighteenth-century political theorist emphasized the anti-constraint thesis that
pervades this Article. MORTIMER N.S. SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN
IDEOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 165 (1994) (describing the view of
Montesquieu that republicanism differs from the other two forms of government, monarchy
and despotism, in that it recognizes "more than one sovereign").
401 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 117 (1980).
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participation, stereotyping thwarts a design for national government: The
Constitution, as Akhil Reed Amar has observed, put "some form of democracy
into each of its seven main Articles." 40 2 Fixing the problem of stereotyping joins a
larger project of making American democracy and civic life stronger.
Fixing this problem, I have contended, calls foremost for understanding
it. A definition of stereotyping as a legal wrong does not yet exist, but elements
have emerged. To warrant attention from the law, I have argued, stereotyping must
amount to a wrong. Wrongness takes two distinct facets: first, harm to stereotyped
individuals, and second, enough falsity or unreliability to outweigh the utility of a
ready shortcut. Stereotyping is among other things a heuristic. Individuals will
fight to keep tools that help them understand their environments and make
decisions. This Article has been mindful that the work of easing the constraints of
stereotyping, like any other push for emancipation, has to pick its battles.
Toward this end, I note that liability for stereotyping simpliciter would be
difficult to enlarge. Stereotyping of itself does not hew closely enough to
paradigms of responsibility for harm that govern civil rights, tort, criminal, and
regulatory law.403 Before a person can be held liable, American law demands that
she hold a modicum of consciousness, which stereotyping functions to obscure.404
People who regard others through the lens of a stereotype did not invent the
generalization they invoke, cannot control it, might be unaware that they are
making a socially harmful construct proliferate, and experience its reductive
message (X group has Y trait) moderated by doubts, qualifiers, and refutations that
assemble ad hoc and unpredictably.405 Thus I have not advocated new causes of
action for stereotyping. The repairs recommended in this Article, working with
established rights and wrongs, have enough to do.
A last caveat: Social psychology aids the project urged in this Article, but
policy makers ought to use it with care. Voluminous writing about the ubiquity of
stereotyping in human societies, for example, could unnecessarily dampen reform
efforts. Just because antisocial impulses and conduct are always with us does not
mean that changing the law cannot ameliorate this wrong. Another strand in this
402 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 15 (2005).
403. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976) (distinguishing between
discriminatory intent and disparate impact, treating the former category more stringently in
the context of race discrimination); Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 260 (1979) (same;
sex discrimination); Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616) (explaining that
liability for "trespass of assault and battery" is not available "if a man by force take my
hand and strike you"); Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and
Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REv. 269 (2002) (describing responsibility as criminal law
understands it); Barak Orbach, What is Regulation?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 6 (2012)
(observing that although there is no settled definition of regulation, the concept manifests in
"a binding legal norm created by a state organ that intends to shape the conduct of
individuals and firms").
404. Denno, supra note 403, at 271.
405. See supra Part II.C.
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literature, positing a contrast between descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping,406
emphasizes a distinction that distracts from the necessary and fundamental
attention to harm central to the law. Description prescribes and prescriptions
describe. Any stereotype that functions to limit human freedom, even when put in
the form of "X [group] is" rather than "X cannot" or "X must never," expresses
coercion.
Legal-institutional actors have started the reform work that I advocate.
Rectification precedents include changes to evidentiary law that fight stereotypes
about female sexual consent and ascribed female irrationality; the statutory civil
rights category of "regarded as disabled" which, aware that a person need not be a
member of an oppressed group to suffer from the stereotyping of its members,
widens a progressive remedy; congressional amelioration of the powder
cocaine/crack cocaine sentencing disparity, a gap that rests on a racial stereotype
about violence; and successful challenges to laws that demand gender dimorphism
as a criterion for entry into marriage. These reforms enlist judges, legislators, and
laypersons. The same cohorts identify, describe, clarify, and repair what's wrong
with stereotyping.
406. See Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women
Should Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 665, 665-66 (1999).

